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Psychological research on problem solving began with 
Thorndike's WQrk on trial and error learning with cats, 
dogs, and monkeys. Kohler later initiatea research with apes 
which convinced him that problems coula be solvea with 
insight. Thr~ugh the 1940's, the stuay of human problem 
solving focused on general principles (following the Gestalt 
traditiQn) ana S-R mechanisms to explain how people salve 
problems. 
The advent of cemputer technology in the 1950's spurrea 
research in artificial intelligence, game playing, ana 
problem solving. Formal definitions Qf prQblems outlinea the 
cempGnents •f a constituting the problem 
representation. This providea a framewQrk for computer 
scientists to mechanize problem SQlving with algorithms of 
• •• • ," ,' 'A ,,_ 
search. Computer scientists met with success in aeveloping 
prGgrams to work on well-defined problems, such as games ana 
puzzles, where the components of the problem representation 
are easily stated. Once the representation is aaoptea, 
solution is a matter of search. 
It has been shown that the efficiency of mechanized search 
is aided by the use of a ''heuristic evaluation function" 
(Nilsson, 1971), which has a form similar tQ psychological 
models applied in research on human aecision making ana 
judgment (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1972). Samuel (1959), 
used a regression mQdel of human judgment basea on the 
knowleage of skilled checkers players in oraer to proauce a 
heuristic evaluation function for a checkers playing 
program. Another model which can also be usea to proviae a 
heuristic evaluation function is based on Anaerson's (1962) 
technique of functional measurement. This approach allows 
estimation of subjective scale values for the levels of 
information components relevant to playing a game. 
In contrast to these linear models, Eagell (1978) has arguea 
that people can utilize configural information when making 
judgments, an issue which has been avoiaea by most aecision 
modelling research. Samuel (1967) showea that use of 
configural infermati$n by a heuristic evaluation function 
can augment the skill ~fa checkers playing program, but the 
question of whether human players use such information was 
not researched. 
This paper reports one 
experiments which were 
pilot experiment and two other 
conductea tg investigate whether 
people do use configural information when evaluating 
alternative moves in a game situation. The effects Qf game 
experience, learning, ana training on use of c~nfigural 
information were examined. In addition, the research was 
cenducted in a game playing situation in oraer to aaaress 
the issue of ecological valiaity (Neisser, 1976) in 
psychological research. As Newell ana Simon (1972) have 
argued, a geed psychological theory ef h~w a gooa chess 
player plays chess sh~ula play good chess. 
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How does a person learn to play a good 
checkers, or Othello, for that matter? 
how does one learn what constitutes 
game of chess or 
More specifically, 
a good move? What 
factors are involved and how does one use them to evaluate 
potential moves? This research will attempt to answer these 
questions. In doing so, a comparison will be made between 
models of human judgment based on algebraic information 
integration (Anderson, 1974) and models based on configural 
pattern learning (Edgell, 1978). These models postulate 
that people use decision functions which are based on 
available information about the alternatives. The 
information integration approach assumes that people 
evaluate attributes of an alternative independently and then 
integrate these evaluations to arrive at an overall 
impression of the alternative. The configural models suggest 
that people gain an impression of an alternative by 
responding holistically to the total configuration of all 
available information. This research will be set in a 
typical game-playing situation in order to model the 
decision strategies of players as they gain experience in 
- 2 -
the game of Othello. 
It is suggested that modelling human decision functions is 
an important part of studying human problem solving behavior 
in general. An overview of problem solving research will be 
presented and the role of decision modelling will be 
discussed. An important contribution, examined in the 
present research, is the ability to measure the development 
of evaluation skills as individuals gain experience in a 
problem domain. With experience, people learn to judge the 
goodness of alternatives by evaluating their attributes. 
Models of a person's subjective decision or evaluation 
function can be constructed and tested at various stages of 
the person's experience. This type of research can indicate 
how people develop and modify their decision strategies as 
they gain experience in solving problems. 
A Brief Overview of Some Problem Solving Research 
Discussion on problem solving dates as far back as 300 A.D., 
the time of the Greek mathematician Pappus (Polya, 1945). In 
the seventh book of his "Collectiones", Pappus describes an 
area of study he calls "analyomenos", which can be 
interpreted as "art of solving problems", or even 
"heuristics", a term which will be defined later in a formal 
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context. The study of problem-solving behavior in 
psychology probably began in 1898 with Thorndike's work with 
cats, dogs, and later monkeys (Thorndike, 1898/1970). This 
was part of his dissertation on animal intelligence. In a 
typical experiment, a cat 
"puzzle-box". Careful 
or dog was 
observations 
placed inside 
were made of 
a 
the 
attempts of animals to escape from a box by activating a 
latching mechanism. With experience, an animal got better at 
puzzle-box tasks, and Thorndike hypothesized a build-up of 
associative strength as a model for this learning process. 
His conclusion was that animals simply learn by the chance 
formations of associations in their random experience and 
that they show no evidence of inferential reasoning. 
Thorndike defines reasoning as" the function of reaching 
conclusions by the perception of relations, comparison, and 
inference " (p.184). Even today it is not unreasonable 
to conceive of much problem solving and thinking occurring 
from the effects that follow a trial and error process. 
Kohler (1927), of the Gestalt tradition, undertook research 
on the "mentality" of apes for two reasons. The first reason 
was to ascertain whether apes can behave with intelligence 
and insight under conditions which require such behavior. 
The second reason was to investigate the pure nature of 
intelligent acts, chiefly by observing the types of behavior 
and errors produced by apes. Kohler chose apes as the 
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subjects for his research because of their close 
phylogenetic proximity to humans, compared to that of :ats, 
dogs, and monkeys used by Thorndike. Kohler's definition of 
"intelligence" {p. 3) was: 
"As experience shows, we do not speak of behavior as being 
intelligent when human beings or animals attain their 
objective by a direct unquestionable route which clearly 
arises naturally out of their organization. But we tend to 
speak of intelligence when, circumstances having blocked the 
obvious course, the human being or animal takes a roundabout 
path, so meeting the situation." 
Kohler conducted a series of studies 
insight 
which convinced him 











which is out 
with ape 
of reach. The ape 
the 
attempts to obtain the fruit with behaviors which have been 
appropriate in other situations, but which are no longer 
fruitful (grabbing, jumping, etc.). At this point, the 
animal paces the room anxiously. Suddenly, the animal's 
behavior changes completely (insight has occurred), and the 
ape quickly solves the problem (eg., it pulls a crate 
beneath the hanging banana, jumps on the crate, and grabs 
the fruit). In trial and error learning, an animal slowly 
gets better at a specific task. Kohler argued that his apes 
had gained insight because when they were again exposed to 
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the same situation they performed the task perfectly. 
Kohler rejected the associationistic doctrine, on the 
grounds that it cannot predict the finding of insight. He 
states that problems are solved from a grasp of the 
structure of the problem and from knowledge of the 
relationships between elements of the problem. 
Problem solving research through the 1940's and 1950's 
focused on Gestalt-oriented theories, following the work of 
Kohler (Maier, 1940), and S - R theories, following the work 
of Thorndike and Hull. Maier (1940), characterized a 
problem situation by the fact that it blocks behavior. He 
describes a problem operationally: "If a situation is 
presented to an animal and elicits neither native nor 
acquired responses which remove the animal from the 
situation and if in addition the motivation is such as to 
demand such removal, then the animal is confronted with a 
problem." Maier cites the "string problem", among others, to 
argue the existence of certain behavior mechanisms used in 
solving problems. 
The string problem requires the individual to tie the ends 
of two strings together, where each string is hanging from 
the ceiling. However, the strings are separated such that 
the individual cannot grasp the two strings at the same 
time. The solutions, Maier lists, fall into four patterns, 
- 6 -
(1) extending the reach by the use of a pole or some other 
object, (2) increasing the length of one of the strings by 
fastening an extension to it, (3) anchoring one string at a 
mid-point between the strings, (4) fastening a weight to one 
string, and thus constructing a pendulum. 
The possibility of each solution can be manipulated by 
leaving certain objects in the room with the subject. Maier 
postulates three separate behavior mechanisms which can lead 
to the solution of such problems. The first, called 
"variability of behavior", is a trial and error process 
whereby the individual tries various approaches to solving 
the problem in an apparently random fashion. The second, 
called "equivalence relations", is a mechanism whereby 
individuals try solutions which have been useful in similar 
problems. Finally, he argues for a process called 
"spontaneous integration", in which a problem is solved by 
the "integration" of two or more past experiences. He claims 
that spontaneous integration is different from the others 
because it involves a "new combination" of objects (the use 
of a pair of pliers tied to the end of one string). 
Many of the problem situations studied in the 1940's and 
1950's were similar to that of Maier's, in that a novel 
function or operation for an object provided the solution. 
Duncker (1945) found that the use of a box as a physical 
support in the solution of a problem was unlikely to be 
- 7 -
discovered by people who had witnessed the box being used as 
a container. The problem is solved because of a new way of 
thinking about the problem or the available materials. 
Insight problems are resolved when the appropriate structure 
or problem representation has been found. Maier explained 
that the inadequate design of problems had been responsible 
for much confusion in the psychological investigation of 
problem solving. He stated, "Each experimenter chose his own 
pet problems and then generalized on the nature of problem 
solving. Thus the use of certain problems led to the notion 
that problem solving was a matter of trial and error and 
could be reduced to learning; transfer of training 
experiments supported the notion of generalization and 
concept formation; and detour experiments supported the 
insight hypothesis." 
Maltzman (1955) probably epitomized the approach of S-R 
theorists in the study of problem solving. He drew heavily 
on the terminology of Hull and on the concept of "habit 
family hierarchies" to explain how people select which 
approaches to try in solving problems such as the string 
problem. A habit family hierarchy is a priority ordering of 
separate responses which are evoked by a stimulus. If an 
organism is not reinforced for the first response in the 
hierarchy, it generates the second response and later 
responses until it is reinforced or the set of responses in 
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the hierarchy has been exhausted. Where the stimulus is a 
complex problem situation, Maltzman hypothesized that the 
responses are alternate approaches to solving the problem. 
Most of this early work did not generate testable hypotheses 
about problem solving skills, and as Maier pointed out, the 
conclusions drawn from the research were related more to the 
type of problem chosen, rather than psychological 
principles. In modern 
done by the subjects 
terms, the information processing 
of these experiments would best be 
called problem representation, rather than solution finding. 
Problem representation refers to the process of developing a 
framework for finding a problem solution. This will be 
defined formally in a later section. 
In the 1950's, computer scientists began work on programming 
computers to play games intelligently and to solve logic 
problems. Shannon (1950) reported methods for programming a 
computer for playing chess, while Newell and Simon (1956) 
and Newell and Shaw (1957) developed "The Logic Theory 
Machine", followed by the "General Problem Solver" or GPS 
(Newell and Simon, 1961). The success of these and similar 
programs was in part due to, and in part the cause of 
research on the formal representation of problems (Nilsson, 
1971). This success also encouraged a new look at the 
elements of a theory of human problem solving (Newell, Shaw, 












The ability of computer programs to begin to emulate human 
intelligence was largely due to the fact that they worked in 
well-defined problem domains, such as games and puzzles 
where the problem structure and legal transformation rules 
are given. With the development of formalizations of 
problems came opportunities for psychology to address new 
issues of human problem solving. By studying the behavior 
of humans in well-defined pcoblem domains, such as the game 
of chess, and logic puzzles, research on problem solving 
could focus on psychological skills involving decision 
processes and judgment. 
Scientists in computer science and psychology soon found 
themselves working on 
comprehension, problem 
similar problems, natural language 
solving, pattern recognition 
processes, and others. However, differences in the 
philosophies of artificial intelligence {AI) scientists and 
cognitive psychologists have begun to become a cause for 
criticisms between the two areas {Miller, 1978). Miller's 
thesis is that computer scientists are interested in 
developing adequate theories which describe problem solving 
processes, done by machine. To the extent that the machine 
emulates human performance, the theory on which machine 
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performance is based is also accepted as a model of human 
thought processes. He places psychologists in the role of 
theory demonstrators, rather than developers. 
Psychologists's main efforts, according to Miller, are 
directed toward demonstrating the correctness of one theory 
versus another with the collection of empirical data. 
According to 
believe that 
Miller, computer scientists 
no adequate theories exist 
are claimed to 
because most 
psychological research is done in a vacuum, and that 
psychologists see the work of computer science as little 
more than the development of programs which may be 
interesting, but which offer 'no insight toward human thought 
processes. 
Miller's analysis, though it may seem a bit pessimistic, 
includes the suggestion that scientists in both areas might 
profit from an examination of their own approaches to 
scientific investigation. It may be appropriate for some 
psychologists to embark on a bit more theory development 
while it may behoove some AI scientists to make more of an 
effort at theory demonstration. 
Newell and Simon (1972) outline their comprehensive theory 
of problem solving. According to them, a good information 
processing theory of good human chess players should play 
good chess. They also mention that their theory posits 
internal mechanisms of great extent and complexity, and 
- 11 -
their research is an endeavor to "make contact" between 
those mechanisms and the visible evidences of problem 
solving. They also add that their theory is non-statistical 
in the sense that it is not easily testable with routine 
statistics. Their philosophical orientation matches that of 





disparities between AI and 
not dissimilar to those between 
associationistic and Gestalt psychology. Associationists 
endeavored to prove the existence of each new theoretical 
mechanism with empirical data while Gestaltists posited 
broad perceptual principles and sought to make contact 
between them and the visible evidences of human perception. 
The justification for this approach used by Gestaltists and 
AI scientists is the same. The topics under consideration, 
it is claimed, are much too complex for development of 
comprehensive theories using the empirical approach. 
The contemporary study of problem solving may be roughly 
split into two main areas dealing with judgment and search. 
These two areas have been researched by theory demonstrators 
and theory developers, respectively. There exists a large 
body of psychological research and methodology in the area 
of human judgment and 
foundation for research 
situations. This type 
decision making to provide a 
on judgment in problem solving 
of research has followed the 
L__ 
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empirical approach. On the other hand, there exists a great 
deal of work in artificial intelligence on sophisticated 
search methods used in mechanized problem solving. Computer 
scientists (such as Newell and Simon) have based their 
models of human search processes on their knowledge of the 
information processing requirements for implementing search 
on machines, as well as on psychological work on the 
capacities and limits of humans as information processors. 
Elegant formalizations of problem solving have been 
developed as part of the work in artificial intelligence. An 
examination of one formalization, the state-space 
representation (SSR) will help to define the nature and 
inter-relation of judgment and search in the formal problem 
solving process. This will also provide a framework for 
reviewing the contributions of specific research in the 
study of problem solving. 
In the following sections, the SSR will be discussed, along 
with work in cognitive psychology and AI. It will be shown 
that one vital part of the problem solving process (the 
heuristic evaluation function) may best be studied following 
the lines of work established by cognitive psychologists on 
human decision making and information integration 
processes. Multiple regression models and information 
integration models will be reviewed as possible models for 
human evaluation functions. Research in a game-playing 
"'-·· 
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situation will be proposed, and some pilot data will be 
presented. 
State-space Representations 
A state-space representation consists of four elements (1) a 
set of state descriptions, (2) an initial state, or a set of 
initial states, (3) a~ state, or a set of goal states, 
and (4) a set of operators, which transform one state or a 
set of states into a single state. Formally, the first three 
elements may be sets of infinite size, while there must be a 
finite number of operators. Nilsson (1971) and Winston 
(1977) offer more detailed accounts of SSRs. 
Any problem is solved in two major steps. First, a problem 
representation must be adopted. That is, the four elements 
must be defined. Secondly, the solution of the problem is 
found through continual applications of the operators to 
eventually transform an initial state into a goal state. 
This process is called search. 
As an example, consider a 2 X 2 sliding tile puzzle. 
Figure 1 depicts the four elements in a possible SSR for a 2 
X 2 puzzle problem. 
Given the initial position, the problem is to successively 
move tiles which border on the blank position into that 
space until the configuration of numbered tiles matches that 
- 14 -
(l) State description: A 2 X 2 array of cells, individually labelled 
with permutations of the elements (1, 2, 3, -) . 
(2) Initial state: 
(3) Operators: Interchange the blank position (hyphen) with either 
orthogonally adjacent tile. 
(4) Goal state: 
Figure 1. The four components of a problem representation 
for the 2 X 2 sliding tile puzzle. 
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in the goal state description. Now that the four elements of 
SSRs have been defined for this problem, a state-space graph 
can be constructed, and it is shown in Figure 2. 
The graph is a group of inter-connected state descriptions. 
Each state description is called a node, and the double-
headed arrows connecting them are called edges. The initial 
state is labelled at the top of the graph, and the goal 
state is also labelled. Each arrow signifies the application 
of an operator to transform one state into another. The 
double-heads indicate that an operator may be applied to 
return to a state which was just left. Trees, which 
constitute a subset of SSRs, are structures in which such 
retraction is not allowed. They will be the main structures 
discussed in later sections. 
Any path from the initial state to the goal state is called 
a solution path. When an operator is applied to a state to 
produce a new state, the former state is called the parent 
and the latter is called the successor state. 
The choice of this SSR for this problem was 
clarity as an example. The problem of 
representation in general is unsolved 
based on its 
choosing a good 
and lightly 
researched. Nilsson (1971) provides some detailed comments 
on this topic. Depending on the choice of state descriptions 
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Figure 2. The state-space graph for the sliding 
tile puzzle. 
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problem under one SSR could turn out to be trivial under 
another. 
Newell and Simon (1972} give an interesting example with a 
game called "Number Scrabble". In this game, two players 
label nine slips of paper with the numbers one through nine. 
Players take turns in drawing the slips, without 
replacement, from the pool. Players know which numbers they 
are drawing, and the object is to be the first player with 
three slips whose total is 15. With experience, players 
cannot get a feel for a strategy. However, if the game is 
presented under another repr~sentation, players have little 
difficulty in improving their games. Figure 3 shows one 
possible representation for this game. 
When the numbers are arranged in a 3 X 3 magic square, as 
shown in the figure, one can compare the operation of 
drawing a number to that of placing the drawer's mark in the 
appropriate position of the diagram. The numbers are so 
arranged that the sum across any row, column, or diagonal is 
15, and it becomes clear that "Number Scrabble" is a 
convoluted version of Tic-Tac-Toe. 
Choosing the best representation for a problem depends 
largely on the capacities and limitations of the problem 
solver that will be working on the problem. Even among 
computers, the differing architectures will dictate the 
- 18 -
2 7 6 
9 5 7 
4 3· 8 
Figure 3. Magic square representation for the 
game "Number Scrabble'' 
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relative efficiencies of possible SSRs. On the most 
conventional large computer systems, the operation of 
multiplication is performed by successive additions. On the 
Cray-1, perhaps the most powerful computer of the 1970's, 
multiplication is best performed by looking up the answer in 
multiplication tables. The problem of representation is so 
involved that AI research has best been directed toward 
developing efficient methods to search state-space graphs in 
general. These techniques will be discussed in the following 
section. 
State-space search 
In this section, some important AI work concerning state-
space search techniques will be discussed. The "heuristic 
evaluation function" will also be discussed, which will 
provide the major link between the science of cognitive 
psychology and artificial intelligence. 
Nilsson (1971) provides a detailed account of the two major 
search methods, breadth-first and depth-first. For clarity 
of presentation, it is advisable to concentrate on "trees" 
rather than graphs. Trees form a subset of graphs because 
each state can have only one parent state. A glance at 
Figure 2 will show that any state may have two parent 
states, depending on how the graph is traversed (i.e., each 
state is pointed to by two arrows), so this is not a tree. 
- 20 -
In a breadth-first search, a tree is searched by first 
generating all successors to the initial state. Then, for 
each of these nodes in the first generation, its successors 
are generated, creating a second generation. Then, the third 
generation is created, and so on. When the successors for a 
state are about to be generated, the parent state is checked 
to see if it is a goal state. If so, search is terminated 
with success. 
In a depth-first search, an operator is applied to the 
initial state to generate a single successor. Then, a single 
successor node is generated from this first generation node 
to yield a second generation node, and so on until an mth 
generation node is generated, where m is a pre-set depth 
limit. If the depth limit is reached or if it becomes 
impossible to generate another successor for a node because 
all have been generated, then another successor is generated 
from its parent. 
The breadth-first and depth-first searches are called 
admissible because if a solution node exists in the tree, it 
will be found. Note that these two algorithms make disparate 
demands on the processor. Consider a small tree, associated 
with the game of Tic-Tac-Toe. This tree has nine successors 
to the initial state (the first player may choose nine 
positions to play in), each of these has eight successors, 
and each of these has seven, and so on. In order to search 
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the first five generations of this tree for a solution state 
(a player has won the game), the breadth-first algorithm 
requires that the processor store 9!/4! (15120) states in 
memory. The depth-first method requires the storage of only 
six states, one for the initial state and one for each 
generation searched. 
Both of these methods are called blind search methods 
because the procedure for choosing which successor to 
generate is done independently from any information gathered 
during the search. 
Heuristic Evaluation Functions 
The use of a heuristic evaluation function allows the 
assignment of a numerical value to each generated state, 
which should reflect the probability that the state is on a 
solution path to the goal state. With this function as a 
guide, the most promising nodes may be evaluated first, and 
search time may be reduced dramatically. This is where the 
role of judgment comes into play. It has been shown that 
employment of heuristic evaluation functions can speed up 
the search by reducing the number and extent of "blind 
alleys" pursued during search, without sacrificing the 
important property of admissibility. 
To illustrate a potential heuristic evaluation function 
typical of those used in AI, consider a 4 X 4 puzzle problem 
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approached with the use of a heuristic evaluation function. 
One possible function is a distance measure, whose value is 
the sum of the distances of each tile from its desired 
position in the goal state. The heuristic procedure for 
searching the space is simple. First, generate all of the 
successors to the initial state. To each successor, 
associate its distance measure, as calculated above. Pick 
the state with the minimum distance value for expansion. 
Continue to expand all un-expanded nodes, and always pick 
the one with the minimum distance value. 
But how are these functions determined? Usually, the 
programmer draws on personal experience in the problem 
domain. This state of affairs is a major invitation to 
psychological modelling research. For any given problem 
domain, it is possible to model the "heuristic evaluation 
function•, or decision model, of human problem solvers with 
empirical research. 
Samuel (1959, 1967), in two landmark papers concerning 
machine learning in the game of checkers, performed some 
psychological modelling ot master checker players as part of 
his work. His model for their heuristic evaluation function 
was 
R = w(l) * x(l) + w(2)*x(2) + ••• + w(p) *x(p), (1) -- - -- --
where the x's are information components, such as center 
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control, piece advantage, and mobility, and thew's are 
regression weights which prescribe optimal weighting for the 
components. Samuel (1959) ran hundreds of game simulations 
which performed the mechanical adjustment of the weights, 
having surveyed master players for their opinions on 
relevant dimensions. The program played a very good game of 
checkers, and Samuel's work is now a classic in the AI 
literature. 
Later, Samuel (1967) revised his model of feature evaluation 
to include interaction components for the game dimensions, 
which necessitated further ga~e simulations to estimate the 
weights for these interaction terms. However, no empirical 
data were collected, and it is not clear whether master 
checker players do respond configurally. In addition, Samuel 
did not model the scale values that master checker players 
perceive for various levels of the information components, 
an endeavor that has recently been pursued by psychologists 
working in information integration theory. 
Subjective Evaluation Functions 
Information integration is a general term for the process 
performed when someone makes a judgment based on one or 
more components of information relevant to the judgment. 
Brunswick (1956) proposed the lens model, which considers 
the human to be an active processor of information. This 
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model is based on the assumptions of multiple regression, 
which Samuel (1959, 1967) used in his work. Brunswick noted 
that many phenomena in the real world, for example amount of 
rainfall, can be predicted by a number of variables, such as 
cloud density, temperature, and barometric pressure, 
allowing for some error. An empirical multiple regression 
equation can be calculated for these variables, which will 
form a basis for predicting rainfall. In addition, human 
observers can be exposed to these variables and asked to 
form rainfall predictions based on them. From their 
responses, it is possible to derive a best guess at what 
their personal prediction equation is, thereby deriving a 
model of their cognitive prediction mechanism. 
Anderson (1962, 1970) was not willing to accept some of the 
assumptions of the multiple regression model, namely that 
people perceive the predictive values (cue validities) of 
the predictors to be on an interval scale. He has studied 
various judgment tasks and proposed different algebraic 
models which describe how people scale and combine 
information components to produce judgments. 
One of these models, which will also be used for the present 
research, is called the constant weight averaging model. 
According to this model, the response is computed as a 
weighted average of the subjective scale values of relevant 
information. 
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R • ? ( 1 ) * ,! ( 1 ). + ? ( 2) * ,! ( 2) + • • • +! (,E) * ,! (,E) , ( 2) 
where Risa response and there are .E information components 
relevant to a decision. The weight of component.Eis ?(,E), 
constant across all levels of the component, and _!(,E) is a 
subjective scale value which will vary according to the 
particular pr~sented level of component .E• 
Very recently, Fox (1980) distinguished between static and 
dynamic models of decision making, a distinction which 
roughly parallels that of judgment versus search. Dynamic 
or process models of decision making should, according to 
Fox (1980), incorporate a . representation of dynamic 
components, such as transfer of control between cognitive 
mechanisms. They should also include consideration of the 
capacity limitations of working memory and representation of 
the structure of memory. 
Static models describe how humans weight and combine various 
components of information before making a decision. For 
example, Anderson (1962) describes an experiment wherein 
subjects are asked to rate the •1ikability" of hypothetical 
people when subjects are provided with adjectives describing 
the people. The adjectives had been pre-scaled individually 
on their •likability", and the purpose of the study was to 
model how subjects map the input information onto a response 
scale with information integration theory. Slovic and 
Lichenstein (1972) also review algebraic models of cue 
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learning and information integration based on the multiple 
regression model. A major criticism of information 
integration theory and most multiple regression models is 
that they have tended to ignore the possibility that people 
respond to patterns or "configurality" of the relevant 
information, rather than consider the components 
independently. Edgell (1978) presents some work which 
indicates that people can combine or perceive information 
components in a configural manner. 
Norman (1974) pioneered research which involved the 
training of people to respond in accordance with a fixed 
algebraic model of information integration. Other research 
(Norman and Phillips, Note 1) explored how subjects may 
learn the subjective scale values or weights of a constant 
weight averaging model (CWAM) with different transfer 
effects, dependent on training condition. 
In many real-life situations, people are confronted with 
decisions which are amenable to solution with the CWAM. 
done However, adjustment of the scale values and weights is 
along with experience in many decision situations. 
the problem solver does not know what the optimal 
Often, 
weights 
and scale values are, but does have a good idea about the 
relevance of various information components (Dawes, 1979). 
Such is the case when a person is learning how to play a new 
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game. At some point in deciding the best move, the player 
must decide on the promise or value of alternative game 
situations which might result. It is hypothesized that a 
linear decision model might adequately model the cognitive 
process of evaluating the promise or "goodness" of a game 
situation. As a player gains more experience with a game, 
it is hypothesized that he or she is going to change the 
decision function to produce more ecologically valid 
evaluations (ones which will allow winning moves to be 
judged most valuable). 
The popular game Othello w~s chosen for the following 
research. The reader is referred to Appendix A for 
background on the history and rules of the game. Othello was 
preferred over chess for several reasons. It is shorter in 
duration, with even serious games lasting less than an hour. 
It is easy to learn. The average number of available moves 
is around ten, as opposed to 40 or so in chess. Othello was 
preferred to both chess and checkers for the interesting 
property of its end-game. Rather than having more available 
moves as the game draws to a close, the player has fewer. 
Thus, a computer program has a 
the human in the end-game. 
brute-force advantage over 
use of the game Othello also 
provides an opportunity for testing the ecological validity 
of decision models acquired in this research. Once the 
parameters for a decision model have been estimated, the 
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model can be incorporated into an Othello playing program as 
a heuristic evaluation function, and performance of the 
model in the problem domain can be assessed. 
A pilot experiment was performed in which subjects rated the 
"goodness" of hypothetical Othello moves which were 
described solely by information on the position of the 
played piece and the number of pieces captured by the move. 
The intent of this research was to investigate the existence 
of configural effects and to identify changes in the 
component effects which occur with learning (See Appendix B 
for details of the experiment}. 
A factorial presentati~n of nine position types paired with 
three levels of pieces captured or flipped (1, 3, or 5) 
allowed estimation of parameters in an analysis of variance 
model: 
y = £(i) + !<i> + .E!<l,i>, (3) 
where Y is the rated goodness for a move, E(l) is the effect 
of the move's position, !<i> is the effect of the number of 
pieces flipped by the move, and .E.f(l,i> is the interaction 
effect, or the effect of a specific configuration of 
position and pieces flipped. 
Seven non-Othello players participated and were taught the 
rules of the game at the outset of the experiment. A booklet 
of 54 hypothetical moves (two factorial presentations of the 
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9 X 3 design), was filled out by each subject after learning 
the rules of the game. Each subject then played two games 
of Othello against a computer program which chose its moves 
randomly, and they filled out another booklet after each 
game to determine the effects of game experience on their 
use of the information components. 
In individual subject analyses, it was found that the 
component etfects of Position and Pieces Flipped were 
significant. Also, individual differences were found for 
these two components. It was found that some effects 
changed with game experience, .and that individual subjects 
changed their assessment ot Pieces Flipped ditferently over 
game experience. 
Analysis of configural effects revealed that some subjects 
did respond to configural information, but they did not do 
so consistently in each booklet. 
An analysis of variance was performed over all subjects. 
This indicated that the components of Position and Flips 
were significant, but the interaction term was not. 
These results indicate that when the responses of subjects 
are modelled with a linear model, changes in the parameters 
of the model can be found due to learning. In addition, the 
use of configural information by beginning Othello players 
is almost non-existent, or at best inconsistent. 
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Also, as part of the pilot study, data was gathered from the 
third nationally ranked Othello player (M.W.) in order to 
estimate parameters for his response model. Then, a 
heuristic evaluation function based on his model and a 
heuristic evaluation function based on the model for the 
average subject were pitted against each other in a series 
of Othello games. All of these games were won by the 
evaluation function of the ranked player. This provided a 






The pilot experiment found that beginning Othello players 
change their use of information on the position of a move 
and the pieces flipped by an Othello move with game 
experience. However, the decision modelling was done in an 
analysis of variance paradigm, rather than in the context of 
modern psychological decision theory. Experiment I was 
conducted in order to allow for complete parameter 
estimates of a constant weight averaging model (CWAM) and to 
investigate the effects of adding a third information 
component to the design, Countermoves. Countermoves refers 
to the number of alternative moves available to the opponent 
on a given turn. The employment of three information 
components allows for the use of an experimental design 
which provides data adequate to obtain parameter estimates 
in a CWAM (Norman, 1976). 
In this design, subjects are asked to base their opinion of 
a move using information for two information components in 
any given judgment. A complete set of problems is composed 
of three subdesigns, each presenting all combinations of the 
levels of a pair of information components. 
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Each participant played a total of three games in this 
experiment, and each subject responded to four booklets of 
problems. This allowed parameter estimates for decision 
models at four stages of experience, and it provided 
additional data for a test of configural decision models. 
The three information components, Position, Pieces Flipped, 
and Countermoves, are all frequent dimensions of 
discrimination suggested by good Othello players in the 
literature (viz. The Othello Quarterly). Since the 
information components are based on those suggested by 
Othello players, rather than artificial dimensions suggested 
by the experimenter, it is felt that data collected on these 
dimensions will accurately portray the decision models used 
in real play. It may be that one or more dimensions are used 
configurally, while another is evaluated in an additive 
fashion. 
To keep the number of responses at a reasonable level, the 
component of Position had five levels, rather than the nine 
used in the pilot experiment. These corresponded to five 
classes of board position which are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive subsets of the 64 Othello board positions. 
Figure 4 replicates a diagram and accompanying legend 
presented to the subjects during their instructions. 
This grouping of positions was based on discussions of 
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Figure 4. Classification of the board positions 
into five types. 
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similar and dissimilar strategic values of the positions in 
the Othello literature. The corner positions are most 
valuable, because they are "stable" once occupied (they 
cannot be captured). The angle positions are least valuable 
because a move there, adjacent to a corner, may provide the 
opponent with an opportunity to play into the corner. Moves 
in a middle position are usually considered neutral. Based 
on discussion with tournament champions and casual Othello 
Players, the casual players tend to prefer side positions 
over lane positions. 
show a strong preference. 
Champions, however, do not seem to 
One group of novice subjects played a program which picked 
its moves randomly (Group N-Ran), while another played a 
Program which played a better game of Othello (Group N-Max). 
Since the object of the game is to acquire a majority of the 
discs by the end of the game, it is hypothesized that 
beginners will prefer moves which capture more pieces. 
However, it is also hypothesized that as subjects gain 
experience in the game, they will weight the factor of 
Pieces Flipped as less important, and they may even preter 
moves which capture fewer pieces. This is because a piece 
majority in the beginning or middle of a game often results 
in a loss of a choice of good moves in the end game. 
Frey (lgBO) analyzed verbal protocols of people learning to 
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Play Othello, and he posited that people learned positional 
Values with game experience. This research will also allow a 
test of that hypothesis. 
It was also hypothesized that, depending on the skill of the 
opponent, novice players would learn to use the information 
components differently in their judgments. 
Three highly ranked Othello players also responded with 
their values for a set of hypothetical moves. Since they are 
skilled Othello players, it was hypothesized that they would 
Utilize both linear and configural information in their 
judgments. 
Norman (1980) has stated that if information is combined 
according to a weighted averaging model, then certain 
relations will hold among the relative effects of the 
information components in each subdesign. Specifically, the 
rule states, 
m(~,AXB)/~(B,AXB) 
* m(B,BXC)/m(£,BXC) - - -
*m(C,AXC)/m(A,AXC) =l, (4) - - - -
where, for example, ~(~,AXB) represents the magnitude of 
effect of factor A in the AXB subdesign. This product rule 
can also be re-stated by substituting the mean square error 
of a factor for the magnitude of effect. This rule follows 
from the assertion that the ratio of effects between any two 
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attributes is a constant irrespective of informational 
context. This assertion also implies the weaker statement 
that the relations between the magnitudes of effect of the 
factors in the subdesigns will suggest a transitive ordering 
of the importance of the information components. The data 
collected in this experiment will be used to test these 
statements. 
In this experiment, all games played by the subjects were 
recorded to enable tests of the predictive validity of 
linear and configural judgment models. 
To test the ecological validity of the CW~~, the responses 
of one champion player (M.W.) will be modelled, along with 
the first set of responses for every novice player, with a 
CWAM. These models will then be used as the heuristic 
evaluation functions for an Othello playing program which 
will pit one model against another. It is hypothesized that 
the model based on the responses by M.W. will win a majority 
of games. 
Method 
Subjects. Two groups of six subjects and one group of three 
subjects participated. Subjects in Group N-Max and Group 
N-Ran were University of Maryland undergraduates 
participating for course credit. The three subjects in 
Group M (Master players) were those of seven players who 
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responded to a booklet of 78 problems mailed to them. All 
of these players were among the 12 best Othello players in 
the United States, according to the u.s.o.A. rating system. 
Apparatus. All subjects received test "booklets", each 
presenting information on 
and requiring the subject 
three components of information 
to rate the "goodness" of 
hypothetical moves. Each test booklet consisted of two 
repetitions of the three possible subdesigns (a) Position by 
Pieces Flipped (b) Position by Countermoves (c) Pieces 
Flipped by Countermoves. 
Computer runs acquired information on the distribution of 
the number of available moves and Pieces Flipped for the 
first 46 moves of an Othello game. A series of Othello games 
was played in a Monte Carlo fashion on a Challenger-lP 
microcomputer, wherein moves were chosen randomly. Appendix 
C describes the analysis in more detail. This was done to 
allow representative levels of the information components to 
be used. 
The component of Pieces Flipped had three levels (1, 2, 4). 
The component of Countermoves also had three levels (5, lO, 
15). The component of Position had five levels, 
corresponding to five classes of positions which have 
similar strategic values. A complete set of all problems in 
these subdesigns number 39, and a test booklet therefore had 
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78 problems. 
Each test booklet was presented on a Challenger lP 
microcomputer to participants in Groups N-Ran and N-Max. 
Problems were randomly ordered within two blocks of 3 9. 
Champion players 
received printed booklets. Figure 5 
displays a sample problem, as it appeared in the printed 
booklet. 
The format of each problem was identical for subjects who 
viewed them on the video monitor, except for minor features. 
For these subjects an upward-pointing arrow appeared under 
the line scale at the middle position. Subjects could move 
the arrow to the left (Bad) end of the scale by pressing the 
left shift key on the Challenger's keyboard. Likewise, the 
arrow could be moved toward the right (Good) end of the 
scale by pressing the right shift key. When the subject had 
positioned the arrow at the desired place, a touch of the 
"escape" key registered the response and triggered the 
presentation of the next problem. The BASIC program used 
for presentation of these problems is listed in Appendix c. 
Appendix 
O 
contains instructions to the subjects on the use 
of the response scale. 
Subjects in groups N-Ran and N-Max also 
Othello against the Challenger. A 
program is in Appendix c. Briefly, 
played a game of 
listing of the strong 
the strong program 
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1 • * • • • • * • 
2 * * • • • • * * 
3 • • • • • • • 
4 • • • • • • • • 
~ . . . . . . . . 
0 • • • • • • • 
7 * * • • • • * * 
~ • * . • • • * • 
pu:::, l Tl otJ:A1~GLl 
cou,Jl lr<t-':OVi:.S=F 1 VL 
b'°'L.J GuOL, 
1-------------------l 
Figure 5. Sample problem in Experiment I 
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captures a minimum number of pieces during the beginning and 
middle game (moves one through 46), and a maximum during the 
end game. It also avoids angle positions and prefers corner 
positions over all others. In addition, it checks those of 
the opponent's countermoves adjacent to any move position 
under consideration. 
The Othello board was presented on a 62.8 cm. (diagonally 
measured) video monitor as an 8 X 8 matrix of white dots 
("period" characters) on a black background. The letters "A" 
through "H" were used to label the columns, and the numbers 
one through eight were used to label the rows. The white 
pieces were represented by a graphics character resembling a 
white diamond, and the black piece was represented by a 
black circle, with a white lining. The program began by 
presenting the initial configuration of the Othello board. 
After a pause of seven seconds, the program, which always 
played Black (Black moves first), made its first move. A 
black disc blinked on and off three times in the chosen 
position, after which each captured white disc was converted 
to a black disc. The pause for each blink and conversion was 
approximately .5 seconds. The player indicated the position 
of a move by keying first the appropriate letter and then 
the number of the position of the move. The play of the move 
was illustrated by the program in the same manner described 
above. 
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The program, upon completion of a game, printed the message 
0 AN INTERESTING GAME!", and then displayed the final number 
of discs possessed by the human opponent and itself. 
Procedure. The experiment was performed in two sessions, 
the first lasting for approximately 70 minutes and the 
second for 110 minutes. The second session was always 
performed within 48 hours of the first session. Figure 6 is 
a schematic of the partitioning of subjects into groups and 
of the sequence of events for each subject. 
On the first day of experimentation, subjects were trained 
to play Othello and were screened for further participation 
in the experiment. The experimenter first asked all 
subjects whether they had ever played Othello or heard 
anyone discuss strategy for the game. Only naive subjects 
were allowed to participate. The subjects began the 
experiment by reading a section on learning to play Othello 
from an introductory book on the game. The experimenter had 
censored any mention of strategy in this text. The 
experimenter then show~d the subject a diagram of an Othello 
board in a mid-game situation. The experimenter pointed out 
empty squares on the diagram, and the subject responded by 
pointing out which enemy pieces would be captured by a move 
to the position, if any. If none could be captured, the 
subjects had been told to identify the position as an 































Figure 6. Sequence of events for novice subjects in Experiment 1. 
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five consecutive trials, this 
testing procedure was 
terminated. 
rate the goodness of 78 Subjects were then scheduled to 
hypothetical Othello moves. 
The experimenter read each 
subject the instructions shown in Appendix D and responded 
to any of the subject's questions. The subject was shown 
how to adjust and register a response by running the 
"booklet" program through some sample problems. 
After the set of 78 problems was completed, subjects took a 
six minute rest while the experimenter recorded the data and 
loaded the Othello playing program into the microcomputer. 
Subjects were told that they were to play the computer in a 
game of Othello. They were told that it was possible to 
beat the program, but it was also possible that they would 
lose, and they were instructed to try their best. The game 
typically lasted 25 minutes. 
After the game, those subjects who lost the game were 
thanked for their participation and told that the experiment 
was over. Those subjects who won were scheduled to return 
from 24 to 
48 
hours later. They were asked not to discuss 
the experiment with anyone, nor to play a game of Othello. 
Three subjects were not invited back because they were not 
native English speakers, so they had difficulty 
understanding the instructions, and they could not finish 
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the session in a reasonable period of time. Seven subjects 
did not win their game, and and they were not asked to 
continue. 
Upon returning for their second day, 
subjects were re-
acquainted with the nature of the information components. 
They were also reminded of the procedure for responding to 
the "booklet" program and allowed to ask any questions about 
their task. subjects responded to the 78 problems and then 
played two games of Othello against the computer. Each game 
was succeeded with a set of 78 problems. Each game was 
immediately followed by a four minute break and the first 
two booklets were each followed by a six minute break. This 
time was required to record the acquired data and to set up 
the next computer program. 
On the second day, subjects in Group N-Ran played both of 
their games against a program which picked its moves 
randomly, while subjects in Group N-Max played a stronger 
program. All subjects in Group N-MaX lost both games in the 
second session. only one subject in Group N-Ran lost a game 
during the second session. 
Results 
A 1 d to examine the 
na yses were performe 
information components by the beginning players when rating 
the hypothetical moves. In this section, results are 
use of the 
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reported as significant at the £=.OS level. A test of the 
transitivity of the importance of the information components 
was conducted. Analyses were also performed to test the use 
of linear and configural information of subjects in actual 
play. Finally, a test of the ecological validity of using a 
CWAM was performed. 
Beginners' use of information. Three analyses of variance 
were performed on each of the four booklets for each player. 
These analyses were performed on the Position X Pieces 
Flipped, Position X Countermoves, and Countermoves X Pieces 
Flipped subdesigns, respective~y. Appendix E contains a 
table of the magnitudes of effects found in these analyses. 
Table 1 reports the number of analyses in which the main 
effects and interactions were found significant in each of 
the three subdesigns. 
Table 1 shows that roughly half of the analyses on main 
effects were significant, while only nine of 144 tests of 
interactions were significant. Since seven of these tests 
were expected to be significant by chance alone, this 
supports the hypothesis that subjects tended to use linear 
rather than configural models. At least for those subjects 
who showed no configural effects, the linear assumption of 







Subdesign F p C CP FP - -
FP 20 27 
CP 18 25 4 
CF 21 2f -
Total 
Significant 41 45 53 4 
Total 
Tests 9o 96 96 48 4f. 
Tablt 1. Sum111ary of significant effects founcJ 






Champions' use of information. Analyses of variance were 
also performed on the data for the three champion players 
(M.W., M.S., and J.C.). Two of the players (M.W. and M.S.) 
showed significant configural effects for the Countermoves x 
Position and Pieces Flipped by Position interactions, 
respectively. These analyses further showed that M.W. and 
J.C. used the linear components of Pieces Flipped, Position, 
and Countermoves in their responses. Subject M.S. used only 
the components of Position and Countermoves in his 
judgments. Figure 7 displays the Position X Pieces Flipped 
means for M.S., and also for J.C. The pattern of means for 
J.C. is similar to that of M.s;, though this interaction was 
not significant (F(8,8)=3.30, MSe.=.775, E=.056). The 
pattern of these interactions suggests that champion Othello 
players weight the information on Pieces Flipped only 
minimally when the move is to a corner or angle position. 
They utilize information on Pieces Flipped more fully when a 
move is being made to other positions. 
All champions also evaluated moves which capture fewer 
pieces as being more valuable. The effect of Pieces Flipped 
was not significant for subject M.S., but his means are 
included in Figures 8 and 9. The graphs show that player 
M.W. had a stronger weighting for Pieces Captured, as the 
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Figure 7. · The Position X pieces Flipped interaction 
for subject M.S. (top panel) and J.C. (bottom). 
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Figure a. Mean rated goodness for Pieces Flipped by 
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The effects of game experience. All data for each beginning 
player was grouped to perform analyses of variance to test 
learning effects for each subject. Since booklets were 
filled out at four stages of experience, the factor of 
Booklet had four levels in this analysis. Changes in the use 
of linear or configural information are therefore confirmed 
by an interaction with the factor of Booklet. For each 
novice subject, three analyses of variance were performed 
for each of the three informational subdesigns crossed with 
the factor of Booklet. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results 
by indicating significant effects for the subjects in each 
subdesign. The learning effects are shown by interactions 
With the factor of Booklet and the information components of 
Position, Pieces Flipped, and Countermoves. Subjects tended 
to weight the factors of Position and Countermoves as more 
important as they gained game experience. Also, people 
tended to weight the factor of Pieces Flipped as less 
important in determining the goodness of an Othello move. 
More of the subjects who played the stronger opponent showed 
learning effects than those who played the weaker opponent, 
which indicates that they are more often changing their 
decision functions. 
These analyses revealed significant learning effects for 
many subjects, and they also revealed that four ot the 
subjects did respond to configural information over 
,. ' ,, 
!/' / 
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Subdesign Effect Subject 
MR BA MS DH BR MN 
F + + ++ + ++ 
p ++ ++ + ++ 
p X F FP ++ 
BF + 
BP + + ++ 
BFP 
C + ++ ++ ++ + 
p ++ ++ + + ++ 
p X C CP 
BC 
BP + ++ 
BCP 
C + + + ++ + 
F + + ++ +.i-
F X C CF + p <. 05 




Table 2. Significant effects for subjects 
who played the weak opponent. 
Subdesign 
p X F 
p X C 
F X C 
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Ef feet Subject 
MS PS OS KK DG ss 
F ++ + + + + 
p ++ ++ + ++ 
FP 
FB ++ + +.J.. 
FF + + ++ .J.. + 
FPB 
C ++ ++ ++ + + ++ 
p ++ ++ ++ + + 
CP + 
BC 
BP ++ + 
BCP 
C ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ 
F ++ + + + + 
CF ++ ++ 
BC + + p<.05 
BF ++ p<.01 
BCF 
Table 3. Significant effects for subjects 
who played the stro~ opponent. 
- 54 -
booklets. 
The effects of opponent's skill. To test the effects of 
ran om vs. s rong , ana yses o variance were Opponent ( d t ) l f · 
performed on the last booklet over all subjects in Groups 
N-Ran and N-Max. Interaction of any information component 
with the factor of opponent support the hypothesis that 
people may change their decision functions dependent on type 
of game experience. summary tables of these analyses appear 
in Append ix E. 




MSe.=l.93, £=.027). This interaction is shown in Figure 10. 
It appears that both groups agreed on the absolute values of 
corner and angle positions, but they were relatively higher 
for those who played the strong program, compared to the 
other positional values. This is compatible with the notion 
stronger program became more 
the 
that 
aware of the strategic value of the corner. However, it 
people who played 
not learn, over three games of 
d l'd 
Se<?ms that the group This is 
experience, the danger of the angle position. 
commensurate with Frey's (1980) statement that beginning 
Players first learn the value of the corner position, and 











MSe.=5.52, p=. 039) • Figure 11 
portrays this interaction. 
This indicates that people 
who played the strong program 
became more aware of the 
importance of limiting the 
opponent's counterrnoves. 
In the Countermoves X pieces Flipped subdesign, the Opponent 
X Pieces Flipped interaction was significant (f(2,24)=3.82, 
MSe.=1.87, _e=.036). Figure 12 shows this interaction. 
Players who played the stronger program believed that it was 
better to capture more pieces. Apparently, the idea that it 
not emerge for 
is b d etter to capture fewer pieces oes 
Players with only three games·of experience. 
!ests of the product rule. 
For each subdesign analysis on 
each of the 48 booklets, the magnitude of effect for the two 
main components were calculated (Winer, 1962). However, in 
at least one of the main 
factors had a 
20 
magnitude of effect of zero, eliminating these data from 
consideration for a test of the product rule. Alternatively, 
the mean square error for each factor was used. Tables 4 and 
booklets, 
with their product as along 
5 list these mean squares, 
computed by equation 4 • The product rule predicts a value 




, consequently, a goodness of fit test 
cannot be offered. 
1.0. 
However, a weaker prediction can be 





















C A L s M 
Position 
Figure 10. The Opponent X Pieces Flipped 




























Figure 11. The Opponent X C0uf"tPrn10\•t'S interaction in the 



































Figure 12. Opponent X Pieces Flipped interaction in the 




H CP CF -








1 36.4 5., 240·6 46.4 154.5 
2 51.6 101.a 1~4.2 118.7 136.5 
3 7B.6 132.5 288·6 95.9 76.2 
4 64.6 176.5 221.0 219.5 205.2 
l • 1 45.} C::4 ·6 31.2 46.5 
•. lY.9 2~.4 37.7 11.9 17.6 c.. 
3 10.0 50.6 32.9 .30 • 4 26.7 
4 .4 77.£ ~b•4 82.:3 .35. c;'. 
1 144.3 1.3 1u2.1 4.4 20.2 
2 9Yeo lb. ll 213.4 14.9 42.1 
3 .30.:, 2u.e llb•4 9.9 48.4 
4 12.l 24.} lo'• 9 59.4 19.1 
1 14.7 .9 2u.4 2.4 10.7 
2 14.4 •i 41•7 .9 10.7 
3 6Ue2 4.6 ~4.9 1. 5 8.' 
4 5.2 15.7 1y.9 21.7 4.7 
l 156.4 1:3.5 19e.2 .9 60.4 
2 5j. 2 .3.1 2U4•4 1s.e .30.4 
:3 E,O.O 2.b 2b3•3 1.1 84.2 
4 19.7 1.1 276•4 .5 58.2 
1 67.7 47.6 1ue.3 26.2 96.5 
2 11.u 18.u 155.2 2a.2 71.2 
3 52.0 48.5 102.5 48.6 91.b 
4 14.4 20.3 134•5 49.6 88,2 
Table 4. Hean squares of main effects and products for 
subjects in Group N-Hax 
F Product -




11.2 • 0 l 
2.4 J. • e 1 
2.7 l.•Cl 
2.0 •28 
39.5 c: • 4 5 
:38 • 9 .47 
10.7 ·=6 
10.7 4. £.: A 





















.u. ..£L ..£L 
Book F p C p J_ 
1 72.9 2ou 1U4•0 6.o 88.2. 
2 74.l 2.9 o7.7 4.9 54 • .2 
3 53.2 7.b b0o3 1.0 31.5 
4 46.0 5 • O t>!:>. 9 13.1 33.2 
l 14404 25.9 2b7.7 52,6 176,4 
2 5j,6 28,7 lb!:>, 4 25,9 96,2 
3 :n ,3 .34,c: 185,2 8,4 146,7 
4 22,6 :544,9 28,2 310,9 63,7 
1 32,9 10,9 12.3-1 11,1 47,2 
2 62,8 20 ol 119,2 30,2 96,0 
3 42,7 1e.9 1.30.1 29,2 104,4 
4 128,4 24,2 82.4 42,9 10,1 
l 11.0 10,3 2li8 • .3 6,8 174.5 
2 22,U o, 0 621.Q 1.7 318,5 
3 32,4 2.t:, 58508 1.0 343.5 
4 1 ti. 0 9ol 329.7 1~.2 21.3.5 
1 2,5 18.t 22.6 21.1 33.2 
c 1.0 2:,.7 t,.4 30,6 55,5 
3 ,9 4.j 65,2 12.9 47,4 
4 .4 2,8 74,1 1.3,3 50,2 
1 4t:>.9 9ob 1.2 22,8 7.7 
2 2.1 11. l 4.o 37.3 .4 
3 10.2 33.b ·6 47.3 1.6 
4 lb.5 4:, • 9 ·2 66.9 • l 
Table S. Hean squares of main effects and products for 
subjects in Group N-Ran. 
_L Product 











77ol c:: • 53 
4,2 J. • 62 
1~.5 •22 















Case F:P C:P C:F 0 rderi ng 
1. F>P C>P C>F C>F>P 
2. F>P C>P C<F F>C>P 
3. F>P C<P C>F Intransitive 
4. F>P C<P C< F F>P>C 
5, F<P C>P C>F C>~>F 
6. F<P C>P C<F Intransitive 
7, F<P C< p C>F P>C>F 
f. F<P C<P C<F P>F>C 
Table 6. Transitivity implications for all possible inequality 





averaging model predicts a transitivity of effects for the 
information components in the subdesigns. Table 6 presents 
an exhaustive list of all eight possible inequality 
relations among mean squares in three subdesigns, along with 
their transitivity implications. Only two of the eight 
patterns suggest intransitivity. 











for each booklet. These are listed in Table 7. 
mean squares are randomly distributed, 25 
the cases, or 12 of 48, would be expected to be 
However, two cases were dismissed from 
consideration because the values of the mean square error 
for two information components were equal. A binomial test 
reveals that the two intransitive cases are significantly 
fewer than would be expected, thus supporting the 
transitivity hypothesis. 
Behavioral predictions from judgment models. The above 
analyses have shown that subjects do use the information 
components when judging the "goodness" of Othello moves. 
The transitivity results also indicate that these data in 
the three subdesigns can be combined to arrive at a decision 
model based on all three information components. However, a 
predictive test of the linear and configural judgment models 
must be made to show that subjects may be using these 
models in actual play. A model was constructed for a 
Group N-RAN Group N-MAX 
SUBJECT BOOKLET TRANSITIVITY SUBJECT BOOKLET TRANSITIVITY 
RELATION RELATION 
MS l C>F>P PS l C>F>P 
2 C>F>P 2 Intransitive 
3 F> C> P 3 C>P>F 
4 F>C>P 4 C>P>F 
MN l C>F>P KK l P>C>F 
2 C>F>P 2 C>P>F 
3 C>P>F 3 C>P>F 
\ 
4 P>C>F 4 P>C>F 
BA l C>F>P OS 1 F>C>P 
2 C>F>P 2 C>F>P 
3 C>F>P 3 C>F>P 
4 F>C>P 4 P>C>F 
OM l C>F>P DG 1 F>C>P 
2 C>F>P 2 
3 C>F>P 3 F>C>P 
4 C>F>P 4 P>F>C 
MR l C>P>F MS 1 F>C>P 
2 C>P>F 2 F>C>P 
3 C>P>F 3 C>F>P 
4 C>P>F 4 
L 
BR F>P>C ss l F>C>P 
2 F>P>C 2 Intransitive 
3 F>P>C 3 C>F>P 
4 F>P>C L. C>P>F 
Table 7. Priority ordering for information components among booklets 
in Experiment I. 
booklet of the form, 
R = (!(i) + !' (!))/2 
+ <E<i) + E' (i))/2 
+ (£(k) + £' (k))/2 
+ fp(i,i) +££(~,i) +cf(~,!), (5) 
where £(i) is the calculated effect for level i of factor E 
(Position) in one subdesign (FXP or CXP) and E' (!) is the 
same effect in the other subdesign. The f and c terms are 
similarly defined. The term !£(!,i) is the calculated cell 
effect of level ion the component of Pieces Flipped with 
level i on the component of.Position in the FXP subdesign. 
The££ and£! terms are similarly defined. This will be 
referred to as the configural model because the interaction 
terms are included in the equation. The same model, 
excluding the interaction terms, will be referred to as the 
linear model. 
For the first stage of the prediction analyses, the linear 
model was used. A computer program analyzed a booklet of 
data and computed the first three terms in equation 5. The 
program followed Othello games between subjects and their 
computer opponents, reproducing each game during the 
analysis. It computed a heuristic value, according to the 
linear model, for every alternative move on a subject's 
turn. For every game, it based the linear model on the 
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booklet of responses which the subject had completed 
immediately before that game. Since only three levels of 
Pieces Flipped and Countermoves were used in the design of 
the booklets, the effects for non-represented levels of 
these factors were interpolated and extrapolated. For the 
factor of Pieces Flipped, the effect of flipping three or 
more pieces was computed from the slope of the effects for 
flipping two and four pieces. For the factor of 
Countermoves, the effect for leaving 11 or more countermoves 
was computed along the slope for the effects of ten and 15 
countermoves. The effect for leaving nine or fewer 
countermoves was likewise calculated from the effects for 
leaving five and ten countermoves. 
A measure was derived to reflect the fit of 
choice on a turn with the choice which 
the subject's 
followed from 
application of the linear model to all alternatives. A 
simple proportion measure was considered first. To calculate 
this, the range of the heuristic values for the alternative 
moves on a turn would be calculated. Then, the heuristic 
value of the move which the subject actually chose would be 
converted to the proportion of the range it covered. In the 
worst case, where the subject chose the worst move according 
to the linear model, the proportion score would be zero. In 
the best case, the score would be one. 
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Howev er, the number of alternatives on any turn varies, and 
a proportion score measure would tend to over emphasize the 
number of 
fit of a subject's choice when there is a small 
alternatives. · 
Instead, proportion scores were computed for 
all of the alternatives. The score for the goodness of fit 
of the subject's choice was computed as the proportion score 
for the chosen move minus the average of all of the 
Proportion scores. This adjusted the theoretical mean value 
(under the null hypothesis) for the subject's choice 
score 
to 
w· 1 th a small number of alternatives. For example, consider 
a situation in which a subject has four moves with heuristic 
zero, and 
served to temper the scores for choices made 
Values of 15, 20, 25, and 
35. The range 
of values is 20, and 
the proportion scores for 
the moves are 
o.o, 0.2s, o.so, and 
average proportion 
score is 0.44, and 
1.0, respectively. ~e 
the computed score for the third move is o.5 - 0.44 = 0.06. 
Prediction analyses were performed for three games for each 
subject, over the first 46 moves of each game. The end-game 
was not included because subjects had been informed when 
responding to the booklet of hypothetical moves to consider 
moves only made in the beginning and middle of a game. on 
those turns for which the heuristic value of all moves were 
Since every other 
tied, a choice score was not computed. 
move is usually the subject's, 23 or fewer choice scores 
were computed per game. The mean of these was then tested, 
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Using a t-test, for its significance from zero. The mean 
Choice 
score, along with its standard deviation and t-value 
is i 
ncluded in Table 8 for every analysis. There appears to 
be no 
systematic relation between the means and their 
deviations, so a transformation of the choice 
scores is not necessary. 
!n l 
a most every individual analysis, the predictive validity 
of a linear decision model was substantiated. 
Ana1~ses . d 
r were also pertorme to test for the predictive 
Validity of configural effects. For any given turn, a choice 
score was computed according 'to the 1 inear model, and one 
~as l l i a so computed according to the full mode n equations, 
er the contigural model. Then, a ditference score was 
computed by subtracting the choice score of the linear model 
frorn that of the configural model. Again certain 
approximations had to be made in the heuristic model because 
the configural effects were measured at only a finite number 
Of 1 eve1 s in the booklets. Referring to equation 5, the 
factor · d · 1'ndexed by i for the · ot Pieces Fl ippe 1s ma 1n 
effects and interaction effects. Consider the number of 
Pieces Flipped by a move to be represented by the variable 
~. For the purpose of indexing the interaction terms, a 
Value of one for n was regarded as a one for i. Values of 
t~o and three on n were interpreted as a value of two on i. 
I 
I ; , 
! ,1.·1 
Subject N Score SD t 
(Hean) 
23 .26 .on 3. :t. tl 
MS 23 .16 .07 :! • 29 
:.!3 .30 QCl . ' :~. 40 
22 .3'1 .Ol 5.51 
MN 18 • •17 • Ot., e. o:'_:; 
... >-::· .19 • Nl r\ ·~:t ··:, •.. \..) .. ~· .. \,} / 
":, ··i· 
'-·""' .29 . () {) .<;, 46 
BA ;.~:~ .31 () ·:· • ' I 4. ~)5 
::>3 .33 () () .. "'· .1.:..1..Q. 
23 • 0;:1 ()<.' • I .BJ 
DM ,.,-.:..~ .19 • 0·7 2. 6;.~ 
r) "1 
..... .J .13 .OB 1 '7 ''l • I 11.· •• 
•") ,., 
• l\5 • ()9 4.80 ······-
MR '') ... oo • OS:J 1.10 "'-~ . ' 
::!3 .19 .O>" 2. ~7 :i 
:~3 .19 .06 3.04 
BR ,., ·:r •· .. v .19 .OB 2.35 
23 .26 .06 4.79 
23 ._24 0 ' + I 3.43 
PS 23 .25 .06 3.94 







23 .20 .OB 
'") '") 
.:_,,,;_ .24 .08 3 .19 
23 .29 • 09 3.30 
23 .23 .O'/ 3. :!.9 
r) '") 
_,;_,,,;_ .32 • Ofl 3. '?:?. 
:.~ :5 .17 . • () tl 1.9'7 
r) -.., 
.: .. ~~ +33 .o:-- 4. 'i'O 
:!o .,., .. z .... w • 09 2. ·l6 
r) ·r .31 .on 2.8b ...... , 
,.)''' r)O • C•t.; 4,4() ... _ •· .. • •- I 
I')'") .:P .on ,) • i:l4 .,.: .. ...... 
•"")'') .13 • ()8 1 . '/ ~-:,; ..:...,: .. 
::!. :·5 .42 ,05 <.,>, 00 
21 • 09 .09 .96 
2:~~ .20 .08 2.39 
. 
Prediction scores and t-values for the linear model for 
three games for six subjects who played the weak program 
(first 18 table entries) and for those who played the 
strong program (last 18 entries). 
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Values of four or more were transformed to an i value of 
three (level three is four pieces captured). Similarly, if 
the number of countermoves was seven or less, a k value of 1 
was used to index interaction terms. When number of 
countermoves were greater than 12, or between eight and 12, 
k values of 3 and 2 were used, respectively. 
If the subjects were using configural information, then the 
difference score would be expected to be greater than zero. 
Table 9 displays the results oft-tests performed on these 
difference scores. 
It can be seen that the hypothesis that configural 
information was used by the subjects in making their 
decisions receives no general support. 
Ecological validity of linear judgment models. Finally, the 
decision models should be subjected to a test of their 
ecological validity. It has been shown that linear models 
are adequate to predict the behavior of subjects when 
playing the game Othello, so the next step is to objectively 
evaluate the validity of the models when used as heuristic 
evaluation functions. 
A parameter estimation program, SIMILE, (Norman, 1979) was 
used to analyze the booklets for the subjects. It produced 
parameter estimates for the CWAM (equation 












Subject N Score so t 
(Mean) 
23 -.07 .04 -1.81 
MS 23 -.03 .04 -.83 
_,Zi -·.02 .04 -.57 
22 -.46 .04 -1.05 
MN HJ -.17 .os -2.10 
-2..3._ -.02 .05 -.45 
23 -.03 .02 -1.48 
BA 23 -.01 .05 -. 18 
23 -.10 .06 -1.79 
23 .06 .05 1.39 
DM 23 -.06 .04 -1.42 
· 23 -.08 .04 -2.22 
2:?. -.17 .09 -1.9'7 
MR 23 -.04 .03 -1.24 ,.,~ 
b'"',., -.05 .05 -1.04 
23 - .19 .07 -2.60 
BR 23 o··· - . . ... ) .03 -1.67 
23 -.09 .05 -1. 7'? 
2~ -d3 .04 -3.13 
PS 23 -.07 .03 -2 .10 
23 -.13 .06 -2.20 
P) l 
,:.. ...... -.01 .04 -.i6 
KK 2:~ .01 .05 1.02 
23 -.03 .04 -.94 -- 23 -.04 .04 -.91 
OS 2:~ -.04 '"'• 02 -1.55 ,.,~ ...... ., -.11 .07 -1. C.>0 
Hu+ .::. .... ., -.04 .04 -I.lo 
DG 20 .18 .08 2.24 
23 - • 10 .04 -2.28 
22 .oo .04 -.08 
MS 22 -.06 .04 -1.76 
22 - • 18 .04 -4.71 
23 -.09 . .05 -I.79 
ss 21 .05 .04 1. or; 
22 - .13 • O~'i -2.43 
. 
Table 9. Increased prediction scores and t-values for the configural 
models for three games for six subjects who played the weak 
program (first 18 entries} and for six subjects who played 
the strong program (last tB entries). · 
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information components. In addition, the parameters for a 
CWAM were estimated based on the booklet filled out by M.W. 
Even though M.W. showed configural effects, a CWAM was used 
to capture the main effects in M.W.'s decision model. 
A series of 24 Othello games was played to test the 
ecological validity of using a CWAM as a model of a decision 
function. An Othello program was prepared which pitted the 
CWAM of each of the 12 subjects against that of M.W. twice. 
Once M.W. played Black, and once M.W. played White. The 
program also avoided moves which would offer the opponent a 
corner on the next turn. In addition, the program discarded 
both CWAMs as of move SO and played perfect end-games for 
both sides. Table 10 reports the results of these games. 
The CWAM modelled on the responses of M.W. won 21 of 24 
games, tieing once. A simple binomial test is powerful 
enough to reject the null hypothesis that the modelling is 
not ecologically valid. The CWAM proved to be a good theory 
in that the model for a good Othello player played good 
Othello. Alternatively, it may be considered to be a good 
theory of decision functions because the model for a novice 
player played novice-level Othello. 
-72-
M.W. 
Subject White Black 
DM 28-36 43-21 
MS 23-/4] 33-31 
MN 24-40 51-13 
l BA 14-50 51-13 
! MR 37-27 32-32 l 
I BR 16-4[ 41-23 
PS 22-42 51-13 
KK 20-44 47-17 
DS 20-44 45-19 
DG 27-37 44-20 
MS 30-33 41-23 
ss 13-51 27-37 
Table 10. Game scores from games of a model of M.W. versus 




The subject analyses revealed that four of 12 completely new 
Othello players made use of configural information when 
judging the goodness of Othello moves. In addition, two of 
three champion players also used configural information in 
their judgments. It is clear that ~ome people can and do 
consider the attributes of a move configurally in their 
judgment of its goodness. However, the prediction analyses 
revealed that though some people may use configural 
information in their judgments, they may not be using that 
information in their decision making. 
The experiment was successful in verifying a number of 
hypotheses about how people learn the values of moves in the 
game. Individual analyses found significant changes in the 
judgments of players with game experience, depending on all 
three of the information components. The between subjects 
manipulation ot the opponent's skill also was an effective 
one. Those subjects who played the stronger opponent 
realized the importance of Countermoves and the importance 
of the corner position, compared to those who played the 
weaker opponent. Both of these strategy developments are 
more in line with the evaluation functions used by good 
players. 
Finally, the ecological validation analyses confirmed that 
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CWAMs based on judgment data from beginning players and a 
very good player can stand on their own in the problem 
domain. 
This experiment proved to be a successful attempt to measure 
individual strategy changes adopted by subjects as they gain 
experience in a problem domain and as a function of the 




Experiment II was conducted to investigate some issues that . 
arise from the results of Experiment I. It was found that 
subjects formed different opinions on the goodness of moves, 
depending on their opponent's strategy. However, this was 
confounded with the subject's experience of winning or 
losing a game. Another question which arises from Experiment 
I is whether people can use configural information during 
play. Although it was found that people can make configural 
judgments, no support was found for the hypothesis that they 
used them during their games. 
Experiment II investigates the effects of training a person 
to use certain Othello strategies on the person's judgment 
rule. Norman and Phillips (Note 1) have shown that people 
can be trained, with feedback, to respond in accordance with 
an attribute weighting. In this experiment, subjects are 
taught to use a decision rule, and they incorporate it into 
their strategy as they play a game of Othello. After the 
game, they registered their judgments to the set of 78 
hypothetical moves used in Experiment I. Subjects were told 
to respond with their personal opinions on the values of 




a program w 1c was capa e o playing the subjects played h · h bl f 
laS t 11 moves of an Othello game perfectly. 
Fo r ha 1 f o f the 
subjects , the program did play a perfect end game which 
For 
enabled the program to beat those subjects in the game. 
program always chose end game moves 
the the other half, 
Which, if followed by perfect subsequent play from the human 
opponent, would result in a win by the human. If no such 
based on 
move computer played 
its worst move 
existed, the 
subsequent play. This 
feature was 
the assumption of perfect 
half of the 
subjects to win their 
Programmed to enable 
games , 
but without their detecting that the program was 
Purposely letting them win. 
Three decision rules were taught in the experiment, and this 
13 through 15 depict 
Was a between subjects 
factor. Figures 
the three decision rules that 
were taught 
to the subjects, 
rules used 
by the computer 
along with the decision 
opponents. All rules required that subjects evaluate a move 
based on P . • • s captured, and countermoves. 
os1t1on, piece 
move a point 
Subjects were asked to give each alternative 
Value according to th• rule and then to always pick the move 
With h 
1 
nule 1 was configural because 
t e highest point va ue. ~ 
the number captured either added to or detracted 
of pieces 
from d nt on the position of the move. 
a move's value, depen e 
and 3 were both linear rules 
·nforrnation 




which differed in the 















(2) Pieces captured: 
(A) For moves made to the middle or lane positions 
subtract one point for every piece captured. 
(B) For moves made to the corner or side positions 
add one point for every piece captured. 
(C) For moves made to the angle positions it does 
not matter how many pieces are captured. 
(3) Countermoves: Subtract one point from the value 
of a move for every countermove which would be 
available for your opponent. 
L ____ ... _____ __. 
Figure 13. Training Rule 1. The computer opponent used the same rule 
except that for moves to the corner and side positions it 
subtracted one point for every piece captured and it added 
one point for every piece captured for moves to the lane 
or middle positions. 
- "1 % -






(2) Pieces captured: Subtract one point from the 
value of a move for every piece it captures. 
(3) Countermoves: Subtract one point from the value 
of a move for every countermove which would be 
available for your opponent. 
L-... ·---------------------------
Figure 14. Training Rule 2. The computer opponent for this rule 
used the same rule except that it added one half point to 
















(2) Pieces captured: Subtract one point from the 
value of a move for every piece it captures. 
(3) Countermoves: Subtract one point from the value 
of a move for every countermove which would be 
available for your opponent. 
l---------------·-------~-------------------' 
Figure 15. Training Rule 3. The computer opponent for this rule 
used the same rule except that it added one point for 
every piece that was captured, and subtracted two points 
for every countermove. 
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hYPothesized that differences in the use of the information 
components 
Subjects. 
would be found between winning and losing 
It was also hypothesized that group differences 
Would exist for the judgment data which would support the 
notion that subjects adopt their training rules into their 
judgment model. The strategy of the computer opponent was 
also held constant for subjects who learned Rules 2 and 3. 
'l'his was done so that any differences in judgment models 
could be attributed to training strategy, rather than 
0 PPonent's strategy. 
Method 
Subjects. Subjects were 36 college students and college 
graduates who participated for their own playing experience. 
All subjects had played at least three games of Othello and 
were aware that the corner and angle positions are the most 
a nd least valuable positions, respectively. The average 
number of games of experience for the subjects was 15. 
~PParatus. All subjects received test booklets ot 78 
Problems, identical to those given to the champion players 
in Experiment I. 
All subjects also played a game of Othello on a Decwriter 
terminal against a program on the Univac 1100/40 at the 
University of Maryland. The board was printed at the 
beginning of each move, with "B", "W", and "-" representing 
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blac'.< and white pieces and unoccupied positions. The 
columns were labelled "A-H", and the rows were labelled "1-
8", as in Experiment I. The computer program for subjects in 
the Win condition played its moves strictly according to the 
computer decision rule for the first 40 moves of the game. 
At that point, it began to add one point to the value of a 
move for every countermove it offered. At move 52, as 
described earlier, it chose its best move which would allow 
the human opponent to win. That is, if the computer had a 
choice between a number of losing moves, it would pick the 
best one. The computer program for subjects in the Lose 
condition also followed the computer decision rule, except 
that it also avoided any move which would give the human a 
corner on the next turn. As of move 50, it played a perfect 
end game. 
Procedure. Subjects were run in groups ranging in size from 
one to five. They were all told that they would play a game 
of Othello against the computer, and that they would be 
asked to play according to a specific decision rule, rather 
than the way they would normally play. The instructions 
appear in Appendix D. The experimenter explained one rule to 
the group and entertained any questions before getting the 
subjects started on their individual terminals. After 
playing their game, subjects responded to a booklet of 78 
hypothetical moves, and they were then debriefed and thanked 
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for their participation. All subjects who had lost their 
games were asked if they noticed anything unusual about the 
way the computer played the end game. No one guessed that 
th e Program intentionally lost. 
B!sults 
All results are reported significant at the £=.05 level. 
Analyses of variance tables appear in Appendix E. 
!f_fects of training on performance. As in Experiment I, 
Prediction analyses were performed. In these analyses, game 
Performance was predicted by the training rule for each 
Subject. These analyses confirmed that subjects could 
incorporate the training rule into game play. These analyses 
also found that three of the twelve subjects who were 
trained on the configura1 rule did make significant use of 
configural information while playing their games. Tables 11 
and 12 display these results • 
.!!fects of game outcome and training. Separate analyses of 
variance were performed for each Rule to determine the 
effect of winning on the use of each information component. 
For Rule 1, the effect of Outcome x Position was significant 
in both subdesigns in which it was tested. People who had 
lost tended to rate the angle positions more negatively than 
people who won. Figures 16 and 17 portray these 
interactions. The Outcome X Pieces Flipped interaction was 
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Table II, Prediction scores and t•values for the linear model 
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Figure }6. The outcome X Position interaction for subjects 
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Figure 17. The Outcome X Position interaction for subjects 
learning Rule 1 in the Position X Counterrnoves . subdesign. ' 
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Figure 18. Outcome X Pieces Flipped interaction for subjects learning 
Rule 1 in the Countermoves X Pieces Flipped subdesign. 
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significant in the Countermoves X Pieces Flipped subdesign. 
This is shown in Figure 18. Losing players also tended to 
evaluate more pieces flipped as valuable, while winners did 
the opposite. 
In addition, the Position X Pieces Flipped interaction was 
significant for these groups, as would be expected if they 
had adopted their training rule. However, the Countermoves X 
Position interaction was also significant, which was not an 





neither subdesign, which would be expected 
of the training rule. The factors of 
Countermoves were significant in both 
For Rule 2, the factor of Outcome did not interact with any 
information components. All main effects were significant in 
all subdesigns, and subjects rated Pieces Flipped 
negatively, as would their training rule. However, the 
Position X Pieces Flipped and Position X Countermoves 
interactions were significant. 
For Rule 3, the Outcome X Position interaction was 
significant in both tests, with the pattern of the means 
similar to that for Rule 1. These interactions are shown in 
Figures 19 and 20. Losing players tended to rate corners as 
more valuable than winners, and angles as less valuable. The 
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Outcome 
ermoves X position subdesign, with losers rating 
X Countermoves 
interaction was significant in the 
more 
Count 
This is shown 
count ermoves 
in F" 
igure 21. All main effects of information components 
as 
less negative than winners. 
between information 
were significant. No 
interactions 
compo nents were significant. 
The 
above analyses confirmed that game outcome does affect 
the players concerning 
the goodness of 
the judgment of 
Othell 0 moves. 
_ifferential t · · effects.· o· 
An analysis of variance was 
ra1n1ng 
conau 
cted over groups 1earning Rules land 2 to determine if 
>ng rule or opponent's strategy affected the judgment 
train· 
Of 
the player. The interaction of Rule X position and Rule 
Flipped was significant in both cases, as 
seen in 




, respectivelY• The patterns of the means 
for these h uld be expected · f interactions are bot as wo 1 the 
training rule. Corner and angle 
subjects had adopted 
Positions were rated appro•imatelY equal for the two groups, 
but l d subjects who used the configural rue rate side moves 
more positively and middle positions more negatively. This 
may be due to the fact that subjects in the configural group 
•lways added points to side positions for pieces flipped and 
always subtracted 
points 
Since a fli·ps at 1east one piece, the configural 
move always subJ· d h·gher values for side positions 
ects may have acquire 
1 





















Figure 19. Outcome X Position interaction for subjects learning 
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Figure 20. The C'utcome X Position interaction for subjects learning 
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Figure 21. The Outcome X Counterrnoves interaction for subjects 
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Figure 22. Position X Rule interaction for Rules 1 and 2 in 



















Rule X Pieces Flipped interaction for subjects learning 
Rules 1 and 2 in the Position X Pieces Flipped subdesign 
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and lower values for miadle and lane positions. 
The pattern of means for Rule X Pieces Flipped, as shown in 
Figure 23, also meets with easy explanation. Means for one, 
two, and four pieces flipped for the configural group were 
10.4, 10.7, and 10.9, in the Position X Pieces Flipped 
subdesign, and means for Rule 2 subjects were 11.8, 11.3, 
and 10.5. Since Rule 1 had an overall weight of zero for 
Pieces Flipped, it may be that subjects relied on the 
strategy that more is better. Subjects who were trained on 
Rule 2 used a negative weight for Pieces Flipped, in 
accordance with the rule. 
Three analyses of variance 
groups learning Rules 2 
were also performed over the 
and 3. Since both groups played 
opponents which used the same strategy, differences between 
these groups can be attributed to the training rules used. 
The Rule X Position interaction is significant in both 
subdesigns, as is the Rule X Countermoves interaction. 
These interaction patterns also have intuitive explanations. 
For the Rule X Position interaction, pictured in Figure 24, 
subjects in both groups weighted corner and angle positions 
approximately equal. Since subjects already have ideas 
about the values of corner and angle positions (it was a 
requirement for participation), it is expected that their 
values be approximately equal across training conditions. 
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Subjects who learned Rule 3 :earned Position is twice as 
The Rule 2. 
important as was learned by subjects under 
values of the side position was the second highest while 
that for the lane position was second lowest. Therefore, if 
subjects under Rule 3 do weight Positions more heavily, 
eir ratings for a side position should be higher and their th . 
ratings for lane positions should be lower than those under 
Rule 2. Ratings for side and lane positions under Rule 
2 
were 12.86 and 9.08, while they were 14.74 and 8.37 under 
Rule 3 training. 
The Rule x countermoves interactions, plotted in Figure 25, 
have a similar explanation. It may be that since the factor 
of Position received twice as much importance under Rule 3, 
the factor of countermoves received less weight. This is 
borne out in the judgment data by the pattern of the means. 
Discussion 
in supporting 
This experiment also proved successful 
hypotheses about hoW people adjust their strategies in a 
specifically, the technique ot 
game playing situation. 
measuring the move evaluation of subjects between games has 
Provided a sensitive measure of strategy shifts which result 
from game experience, success at winning, and training. 
This experiment also substantiated the use of configural 
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Figure 24. The Rule X Position interaction for subjects learning rules 
2 and 3 in the Position X Pieces Flipped (upper) and 
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Figure 25. Rule x Countermove interacdoo for subjects who learned 
Rules 2 and J lo subdesigos Position X Countermoves (to) 
and Countermoves X Pieces Flipped (botto~). P 
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Evidence was also found that some subjects could use 
configural information in the game situation when trained to 
do so. 
With training under certain decision rules, across game 
outcomes, subjects do adopt aspects of the training rules in 
th . e1r later judgments. This result is promising because it 
indicates that training can have a direct effect on changing 
a Problem solver's judgment model. It has been shown that 
models of champion Othello players can be derived, and it 
has also been shown that through training subjects can begin 
to incorporate the training rule. A game situation provides 
a Workable context wherein unskilled problem solvers can 
develop ecologically valid judgment models automatically 




This research was conducted to address issues that involve 
problem solving, decision modelling, and ecological 
validation of psychological research. In the area of 
problem solving, Newell and Simon (1972} have stated that 
·one area in need of study is the development of problem 
solving skills. Work in artificial intelligence (Samuel, 
1959} has indicated that machine "learning" can occur as an 
adjustment of the parameters in a heuristic evaluation 
function. Therefore, this research was designed to identify 
a problem solving skill in humans which involves their 
ability to change their judgment models. The results of the 
pilot experiment and both major experiments not only 
verified that changes in the judgment models occur, but they 
also showed that they can be manipulated both through 
training and by more subtly controlling a player's opponent 
and the game outcome. 
One intent of this research was to show that psychological 
methods of modelling static evaluation functions are 
adequate to produce ecologically valid heuristic evaluation 
functions. The produced functions not only have a 
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scientific basis in psychology, but they also have practical 
applications in that they may improve the performance ot 
mechanized problem solvers. One ot the practical 
contributions of this research is its demonstration that 
decision modelling research has practical applications to 
artificial intelligence and also to the training of problem 
solving skills in humans. Skilled problem solvers can supply 
researchers with the dimensions relevant to their evaluation 
function and psychological measurement can be applied to 
determine the component effects and interactions. Models 
can be derived which use the same weights and scale values 
as human problem solvers. From these, machines may be 
programmed to use the models to increase machine problem 
solving skill. For example, the electronic games popular 
today may play more challenging games when they are 
programmed with heuristic evaluation functions based on data 
collected from skilled players. In fact, "Electronic 
Othello" (copyright, 1980, CBS Toys), is based on a version 
of the "strong Program" used in Experiment 3. This program 
uses a heuristic evaluation function modelled after the 
champion player, M. W., who participated in Experiment 2. 
This research explored the effects of some factors 
influencing the judgment models of problem solvers. It was 
shown that linear judgment models can be used to predict the 
behavior ot subjects during game playing. These predictions, 
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howev er, were based on an analysis of move values at a one 
Ply level. That is, the simple assumption was made that 
subjects look only at their move choices without regard to 
potential countermoves by their opponents. Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947) have prescribed the minimax method for 
evaluating the value of a move, based on possible opponent 
onses. SubJects probably also }earn to use this search resp . 
method for two person games, so it may be that the best 
Prediction for the behavior of subjects would involve 
and also gaining 
their evaluation estimati'ng . 
a 
functions 
subject's look ahead. A 
information on the depth of 
Prediction could then be computed by using the derived 
judgment model in conjunction with a minimax search. This 
Prediction would be even better than those made in the 
Present research. 
Trade-offs between _jJdgmen~ ~ .:!.earch. Any judgment takes 
time to make, as does the act of considering future possible 
sequences of play in a game. If a judgment requires a long 
then a player will not be able to evaluate numerous 
time , 
game possibilities, and the person will therefore be limited 
to considering shorter sequences of play. Game programmers 
always strive to strike a haPPY medium between the accuracy 
of an evaluation function and the time it takes to make an 
eva1 uat · ion. 
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People, who also face the same trade-off as information 
processors, probably change their evaluation functions by 
establishing new heuristic dimensions with experience. Simon 
and Gilmartin (1973) showed that skilled chess players 
organized their perception of chess positions based on 
interrelations among chess pieces. The development of this 
type of perception was much less advanced in beginning 
players. The ability to perceive many board aspects as one 
chunk decreases memory load and speeds up processing, thus 
allowing more of the human's processing capacity to be used 
in search. With experience, .skilled players learn what 
aspects of a move should be chunked. Perhaps even a beginner 
could play at a champion level if he or she were trained to 
chunk aspects into some useful dimension, so far unknown. 
Humans are better than machines in games such as Chess and 
Go. It has been suggested that part of this discrepancy may 
be due to the fact that skilled problem solvers have 
developed more ecologically valid evaluation functions than 
game programmers have implemented. It may also be that they 
have more flexible and effective search strategies than 
computer programs. While a computer can always look a few 
plies ahead, in a complete search, humans may learn what 
lines of play to ignore. One possible method for studying 
the search process is to program a computer to aid the 
subject in searching possible lines of play. Especially in 
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the game of Othello, a program which will allow the user to 
Play possible game sequences before deciding on a move would 
be a useful research tool. 
Linear and 
configural models. A major issue in decision 
modelling which was examined in this research concerned 
Whether people do or can respond to configurations of 
information components. Evidence was found which indicated 
some subjects do base their judgments of the goodness 
that 
of a move on configural information. 
However, in the first 




information in their judgments, no evidence was 
configural 
In 
these people based their move choices on 
information while they actually played the game. 
fact, for most subjects in the first experiment, 
Predictions of move choice which included configural 
information were worse than predictions based on a linear 
model alone. These results may be due to the possibility 
that subjects are basing their move selection on factors 
other than position, pieces Flipped, and Countermoves. Some 
Othello players attend to such factors as •c1usteredness of 




compatible with the types of evaluation functions used in AI 
Work in problem solving, ror this reason, this research was 
conducted to extend the study of static decision models to a 
models of information 
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dynamic game-playing situation. Fox (1980) and others have 
their research on process models of decision making. 
focused 
These descr1·be 
judgment as a process which operates over 
models describe the mapping of 
time static . 
info r · . mat1on components onto a response scale, process models 
0 
describe the sequence of steps followed by the human 
While 
seek t 
mat1on processor while implementing a mapping. in for . 
The measurement technique used in Experiment I could be a 
for gathering data to test process models. 
useful tool 
s· ince subjects register their responses by moving an arrow 
across a line scale, data on their pauses may add insight to 
ir processes of information integration. If subjects are the· 
combining two intormation components contigurally, then a 
response may occur as a continuous movement of the arrow to 
the · scale point of th• judgment. If sub3ects combine two 
may occur 
information components linearly, their responses 
movement of the arrow to an intermediate scale 
first as a 
Point which represents the independent contribution of one 





information relevant to 
the second 
and then another arrow movement reflecting the 




indicate that a judgment is broken down by subjects into 
comp onent judgments. 
of 
subject behavior during Experiment I 
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Advantages of modelling the opponent. Learning evaluation 
functions for playing games is unlike learning the weights 
in a regression equation in cue validity studies. In cue 
validity studies, there is an optimal weight for information 
components in the equation which will maximize the accuracy 
of prediction. To predict or evaluate the goodness ot a 
game situation depends not only on the game under study, but 
also on the strategy of one's opponent. 
Othello, like chess and checkers, is a two-person zero-sum 
game. One player's win is the other's loss (Luce and 
Raiffa, 1957). However, in games where players cannot 
foresee the final consequence of a move, it is necessary to 
introduce heuristic evaluation functions to estimate the 
probability of a win. Since both players do not necessarily 
use the same function, one player's perceived advantage is 
not necessarily the other player's loss in terms of their 
respective evaluation functions. 
In Luce and Raiffa's terminology, the games mentioned above 
are strictly competitive, but individual moves may not be. 
That is, since players cannot foresee a win or loss in the 
early stages of a game like Othello, they do not compete for 
a total win. Rather, each tries to attain the highest 
possible heuristic value in minor skirmishes. If a player 
can model the opponent's heuristic evaluation function, and 
if it is different than his or her own, then the player may 
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s~ek to make moves which <!ntice the opponent to cooperate by 
following his or her own function. This type of modelling 
would be useful in winning a game, and it would also reduce 
processing time in deciding on a move. 
It is clear that players do actively attempt to model the 
strategy of the opponent. The verbal commentary ot even 
beginning Othello players is filled with remarks about the 
computer opponent's inferred reasons for choosing a move. 
Surprisingly, these remarks seemed just as frequent for 
players who played a random opponent as for those who played 
a strong one. 
This type of modelling can be measured by asking subjects to 
respond to hypothetical moves as they believe their computer 
opponent would do. This opponent modelling process might 
also account for the fact that in triads of players it is 
not uncommon that player A beats player B, B beats C, and C 
beats A. This may be, in Luce and Raiffa's terms, that 
players win by "exploiting the opponent's weaknesses". Of 
course, in order to do this, one must have a model of the 
opponent's strategy. 
Summary. This research touched on issues in problem solving, 
decision modelling, and validation of psychological 
research. It was shown that some subjects may use 





modelling a subject's decision function may 
subject's choices in a game situation. A game 
was used because it provides a well-defined 
Pro bl em solving domain, while also providing a situation 
Where subjects are motivated to perform complex information 
Processing. Since problem solving can be split into the 
areas of judgment and search, research on judgment models 
can be applied across various areas of problem solving to 
Produce a basis for training skilled problem solvers and 
increasing the effectiveness of machine problem solving. 
Psychological research can provide scientifically valid 
techniques for establishing heuristic evaluation functions 
in AI. Other issues of problem solving and decision 
modelling also prove 
Playing research. Some 
amenable to 
of these issues 
exploration with game 
involve development 
Of search strategies, the development of perceptual ski 11 s, 
a nd modelling of an opponent's strategy. 
- 109 -
~pendix A - History and Background of Othello 
In the 1890's, English mathematician by an the name of 
Sullivan created a game he cal led "Reverse". An article in 
the London Times described how one could fashion pieces for 
the game and play on an ordinary chess or checkers board. 
The r u 1 es d · f h 11 · 1ffer slightly rom Ot e o 1n that the starting 
Pattern could be any configuration of two black and two 
White pieces in the center four squares. In addition, rather 
than the players sharing the pool of 60 pieces, each was 
limited to 30 pieces once the starting position was set. In 
the early 1900's two other "Englishmen applied for patents 
for special boards on which to play this game. Since it is 
imposs 1· bl e ' 1 th s me p t t d to patent a games rues, e e n a en e new 
Playing boards. At about this same time, the name of the 
9ame was altered to "Reversi", and a series of articles on 
st rategy was authored by Lewis Waterman and appeared in "The 
Queen", a London based women's magazine. Reversi enjoyed a 
Period of popularity in England until it mysteriously lost 
its favor with the public in the early 1900's. 
In 1973, a Japanese chemist rediscovered the game and named 
it Othello, because like the play it is filled with 
"d ramatic reversals" • rts popularity in Japan has been 
9rowing since 1976 • Through the summer of 1979, 25 million 
Sets have been sold in Japan, and over five million sets 
have been sold in the United States. 
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In December, 1978, the United States Othello Association 
(USOA) was formed in Washington, D. c. (Note 2). This 
association published the Othello Quarterly, and it works 
closely with CBS Toys, the United States licensee of the 
game, to coordinate and officiate yearly competitions on the 
local, regional, and national levels. 
Playing the Game 
Othello is played on a chess-like 8 X 8 board, except that 
all squares are green, bordered by black lines. The pieces 
are 64 discs which are black on one side and white on the 
other. Figure 26 shows the starting Othello board for every 
game. The four bold dots on the board, as well as the 
starting pattern, distinguish Othello from similar games. 
Black always plays first. Black picks up one ot the unplayed 
discs and places it (black side up) in an empty board 
position such that it captures one or more white discs. To 
capture, black plays adjacent to a white disc, with some 
restrictions. First, an imaginary ray from black's played 
piece must travel through an adjacent white disc and 
continue to travel only through white discs. If the ray hits 
a blank square or the edge of the board, it is terminated 
and none of the white pieces is captured. If the ray hits a 
black piece (an anchor piece), the ray is terminated, and 
all of the white pieces in a direct line between the played 
- I\\ -
0 • • 0 
Figure 26. The starting pattern for Othello. 
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piece and anchor piece are captured. When a disc is 
captured, it is not removed from the board, but it is just 
turned over to the other color. The disc or discs which are 
captured are said to have been "outflankedu, in Othello 
terminology, by the played piece. 
A played piece may be directly adjacent to up to eight enemy 
pieces, so it is possible to capture pieces in eight 
directions simultaneously. In fact, the player must capture 
all capturable pieces from a play. If a player cannot play 
so as to capture the enemy, then the turn is lost. A player 
must capture the enemy if possible on each turn. The game is 
over when neither player can play on the board, and the 
player with the most pieces on the final board is the 
winner. Figure 27 shows some plays for white and their 
capturing rays. 
Playing time ranges from about twenty minutes to an hour. 
Since four board positions are occupied at the outset of the 
game, 60 are left, allowing a maximum of 60 moves in a game. 
Two methods are generally used to record the moves in a 
game, tournament transcription and coordinate transcription 
(Phillips, 1979}. The convention shown in Figure 27, of 
labelling the columns "A - H", and of labelling the rows "l 
8", provides coordinates for every board position. The 
coordinate transcription of a game consists of a list of at 
most 60 coordinates corresponding to the played positions. 
- I \3 -
+ e ;<; ' 
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vo rm. 
+-0 I@ • ~ . • r0 + 
Figure 27. Four p:>ssible moves for black (designated 
by crosses), and their capturing rays. 
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Some games may end before move (or play) 60 because it is 
possible that neither player will have a play before the 
board is filled. 
The tournament transcription is an 8 X 8 matrix representing 
the Othello board. The entry in any cell contains the move 
number at which that position was occupied at the beginning 
of the game. 
With experience, Othello players learn that certain board 
positions are more valuable to occupy than others. Hasegawa 
(1977), in his book on Othell~ strategy, makes use of a 
schema for designating each of the ten "unique" board 
positions on a board. Since, unlike chess or checkers, the 
player does not move with any set "direction" in mind, 
rotations of the board do not affect the strategic value of 
the board position. 
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Appendix B - Pilot Experiment 
Method 
Subjects. Subjects were 7 undergraduates enrolled in 
introductory psychology courses at the University of 
Maryland. They participated for course credit. They had 
never played the game of Othello before. 
Procedure and Apparatus The experimenter instructed all 
participants on the rules of Othello and on how to make 
moves in the game. Participants then observed the first 15 
moves of an Othello game in order to confirm their knowledge 
on how to play. They were allowed to ask the experimenter 
about any of the rules which were not clear. 
All participants then received 54 descriptions of 
hypothetical Othello moves. The descriptions were incomplete 
in that they did not reveal the entire configuration of the 
Othello board. Each of the problems presented a diagram of 
an Othello board with four asterisks in the center squares 
and a piece placed in one of the 60 remaining positions. A 
message appeared under the board which supplied the 
coordinate location of the piece and the number of pieces 
that it captured. Subjects were told that the asterisks were 
placed to provide a frame of reference, and that they did 
not represent pieces of any particular color. 
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Each booklet was constructed of two blocks of 27 problems. 
Within each block, each of the nine unique board positions 
was tested at three levels of pieces flipped (one, three or 
five pieces). Figure 28 shows the nine unique Othello 
positions. These map onto all unoccupied board positions 
through the operations of reflection and rotation. This 
nine by three factorial combination accounts for the 27 
problems in each block. The particular board position 
representing a unique position was chosen randomly, and the 
problems were ordered randomly in each block for every 
participant. 
Subjects were asked to rate each hypothetical move on a 
scale from one to twenty for its •goodness". Instructions to 
the subjects told them to imagine that the moves occurred 
toward the middle of a game, and that each move was from a 
different game. They were warned that no other pieces on the 
board would be presented and that they would not know the 
positions of the captured pieces. They were told to give a 
value of twenty to the best possible move, a value of one to 
the worst possible move, and a value around ten or eleven 
for average moves. 
Participants in Group 1 then played an Othello game against 
a program which picked its moves at random. They then filled 
out another problem booklet, played the program a second 
time, and finally filled out a third booklet. 
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Figure 28 The nine unique Othello positions. 
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Results 
Figure 29 shows the mean rated goodness of a move by seven 
participants for all 27 combinations of position and pieces 
captured. To demonstrate the lack of a Position X Pieces 
Flipped interaction, the points in this figure are 
connected even though histograms would be correct. 
An analysis of variance was conducted on four factors, 
Position (9 levels), Pieces Flipped (3 levels), Games Played 
(3 levels), and Subjects (7 subjects). The replications 
factor was repetitions of problems in each booklet. Position 
and number of Pieces Flipped were both significant, which 
indicates that subjects were using those components of 
information to evaluate the "goodness" of a move. The 
factor of Games Played also had a main effect. Subjects 
tended to rate moves more positively with more game 
experience. Mean ratings were 11.4, 12.4, and 12.6 with 
zero, one, and two games of experience, respectively. The 
analysis also shows that subjects responded differently. 
The lack of an interaction between Position and Pieces 
Flipped indicates that the "average subject" was evaluating 
the information components in an additive fashion, in 
accordance with the linear model. 
The factor of Subjects interacted significantly with 
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Figure 2 9 Mean rated goodnes of moves for all 27 
combinations of Position X Pieces Flipped. 
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between Position and Pieces Flipped. 
Games Played interacted with subjects. This was not 
unexpected. Games Played did not interact with the Position 
by Subject interaction, but it did interact with the Pieces 
Flipped by Subject interaction. 
Individual subject analyses were performed in order to 
assess the appropriateness of a linear model on an 
individual basis. The analysis did not detect the effect of 
any interaction for the information components of Position 
and Pieces Flipped for any subject. 
Discussion 
A factorial presentation of levels of two information 
components was used to measure subjects' evaluations of the 
goodness of moves in the game of Othello. The analysis 
indicated that subjects responded to the two information 
components presented (Position and Pieces Flipped). There 
was no interaction between these two components for the 
group, in accordance with the prediction of a linear model. 
However, there was a significant Subjects X Position X 
Pieces Flipped interaction, indicating that some subjects 
may have evaluated the information components in a 
nonadditive manner. If so, this can be taken as evidence 
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that some subjects did respond to the information components 
in a configural manner. However, as reported in the 
individual subject analyses, for no participant was the 
Position X Pieces Flipped interaction significant. 
The Subjects X Games Played X Pieces Flipped interaction was 
also significant, providing evidence that some subjects 
adjusted their ratings for Pieces Flipped as they gained 
experience in the game. This finding is important, because 
it indicates that some of the learning that occurs with 
problem solving experience can be described as changes in 
the effects of information components in a linear decision 
model. 
The individual subject analyses provide confirmation of a 
linear model used by six of seven subjects. One subject 
showed no evidence of using the information components at 
al 1. Three subjects used only the dimension of Pieces 
Flipped in their judgments. Three subjects used both the 
dimensions of Position and Pieces Flipped in their 
judgments. No subject responded to a consistent 
configuration of Position and Pieces Flipped, as this 
interaction is not significant for any subject. 
However, two subjects did maintain a significant Position X 
Pieces Flipped X Games interaction, indicating that they may 
have responded differently to configurations of the two 
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information components across games. This result is not 
predicted by a linear model, and it is not consistent with a 
particular configural model. It might be argued that these 
two subjects were experimenting with configural model~ ~nd 
that perhaps with more game experience they would respond 
according to a specific configural model. 
The fact that six of seven subjects responded to the 
dimension of Pieces Flipped, while only three used the 
information on Position indicates that Pieces Flipped may be 
a more salient or useful dimension. 
In these individual analyses, the Pieces Flipped X Garnes 
interaction was significant for four subjects. This result 
indicates, as in the overall analysis, that a linear model 
can be used to detect parameter changes by subjects learning 
the game. Therefore, this paradigm may be employed in order 
to test specific hypotheses concerning the way subjects 
adjust their decision strategies with experience. Two 
subjects also obtained a significant Position X Games 
interaction, indicating that they also adjusted 
responses to Position with game experience. 
their 
In summary, the experiment demonstrated that beginning 
Othello players rate the goodness of Othello moves in 
accordance with a linear model over games. However, two 




eon using any consistent configural information 
acros 
s games. The hypothesis that subjects' learning in the 
game of Othello could be measured by changes in their linear 
decision model was supported. This last result is 
Part· lCularly promising because it allows for testing 
hypotheses about how subjects may adjust their decision 
Strate . 
9les with experience. 
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Appendix C - Monte Carlo Analyses 
A series of 200 Othello games was played on a Challenger lP 
microcomputer in order to gather data on the distribution of 
number of available moves and number of pieces captured by a 
move. From this information, representative levels of the 
information components of Pieces Captured and Countermoves 
were chosen for the hypothetical moves presented to subjects 
in Experiment I. The program chose moves randomly, and 
played only the first 46 moves of a game because subjects 
were told that hypothetical moves occurred only in the 
beginning and middle of a game. Figure 30 displays the 
frequency polygon for the number of available moves and 
Figure 31 displays the log(2) frequency polygon for the 
number of pieces flipped (captured) by a move. 
Listings 1 and 2 show the BASIC programs used to gather 
booklet data and to play a "strong" Othello strategy, 
respectively. 
-in 
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Number of Available Moves 
Figure 30. The frequencies of having zero to 24 available 
moves in Othello on a given turn. (measured 
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Pieces Captured by a Move 
Figure 31. The frequencies for capturing one to eleven discs 
while playing Othello. (Measured over 200 games of 
random play) 
.. - ... - . . . 
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~ RiM 23MAYBOOiLETS 
1 J Dl~Vb(S,8) 
ul"1DC <3), FC3),G~(11,2> 15 · 
1 1.10 REM 
104 DI 1JS IN~R•<39),ST(3),VL(5),RS(78),SS(14> UTNSUBJECT NUMBER AND NA"E?";SNSS 
• FOR1=1T0Sh:R=RND(1):NEJT ,, -
115 G 0SU83 :iO 
116 FOR R =0 TO 1 : GOS U 8 2 0 C 
ita FORN=1T039 
119 60SUE400 
- GOSUb9CQ:G0SU85CC:NEXTN 12 .. 
13C NEXlR 
135 FRlhT•HIT SHIFT TO RECORDM 
IFFEEKC57100):254GOT014G 
- SAVE:PRINTSS:PRINTSS , 5 
155 f0RI=1T07B:PR1NTRSCI):NEXT 
1 o ·: G OT O 1 3 5 
?J~ FCRl=1T038:R1=INT(RhD(1)*(39-l)+1> 





' 6 C fORJ=1TOLLN(TS):SS(hS)=SS(NS>+
1 
<?; POKE SS (N s> ,AS C (~IDS (TS ,J, 1)) :NEXT:NX T: R ETUR • 
<8 ~ f0RJ=SS(T-1>+!T0SS(T) :P•PfEK(J):PRITCHRS(P) ;:NE)lT:RHURN 
Listing 1. The •booklet• program. 
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~uO RE~ 







34 : S T ( 1 ) = 3: S l C 2 ) = 6 : S l C 3) = 11 
35~ T=O:FORI=1T05:FORJ=1T03 
352 T=T+1:T2=T+15:FOKEFS+T,I:POKEfC+T,JFOKENB+T ,:l 
355 POKEPS+T2,I:POK~Pc+t2,o:POKEMcl+T2,J 
358 NEXlJ:NEXll:T=3~:FOR1=1T03:fORJ=1T3:T=T+1 
37: POKEPS+T ,(J:POKEPC+T,1:POKEIIIIB+T,J :NETJ:NEXll 
~75 fOR1=1T039:RNCt>=I:NEXll 
3b: DATA3,•POSITI0N=","F1ECES CAPTURED=,COUNTER~OVES= 
~ B 1 D AT A 5 1 • C ORNER " , .. ANGLE" , 11 LAN E .. , "S 1 CE , "M I ODLE • 
385 f0R~=1T04:G0SU825::NEXT:RETUR~ 
I.JC PRIJ-41:PRINT 





425 l'Rlt.T". 11 ; 




















94~ PRINT"BAD";SPC(14);NG000 "; 
98 J RETURN 
999 E f\O 
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5 REM25~AY SMARTPROG 
1J D1M6(10C>,1N(8),fl(2),MB(8),CB(8) 
't5 OIMDC<3),f<3),GPH11,2) 




2d lF NM> :oROff'l>OGOTOi3 
3J FRlNT·INTERESTlN~ GA~E!" 
35 FRINT.HIT SHIFT TO RECORD" 
:6 IFFEEK(571 ... 0)=254GOT036 
Lj ~AVE:F0RI=M0+6QTOM:+1STEP-1:PR1NTPEEK(l):NEX1 
42 .;01035 
1J:~ FRl~T:PRlNT:PRlNT" A B C tl E f G H .. 
1j1; f0RI=2109:PRINT:PRINT:PRINTI-1;:T=<I-1)•10:FORJ=2TC9 
1J4.; FRU,T" ... :FRINTCHRS(FEEIC(M2+,+BCT+J)));:NE>TJ:NEXT1 
, .., - . ... :, .. f0RI=1TO~:FRINT:NEXT:RETURN 
122; FORI2=1T0300:NEXT:RETURN 
ZJCC FORI=1T0100:B(l)=~:NEXTI 
2.)3,J OATA-11 ,-1u,-9,-1,11,1Q 1 9 1 1 :FORI=H08 :READ lNCI) :NE Xll 
2J32 0c<1>=2:oc<3>=2 
tlJ34 ~C=78CO 
Listing 2. The •smart• program 
-
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22.:c l=M::rORR=1TOf:FORC=2T09:T=1+1:BP=R•1 J+C 
222; FOKET,sF:NEXT:NEXT:NF=64 
23 .:.a FORI=1T010:e CI >=2:e(9i)+I>=2 :b((I-1) *1 ':+1 >= c:BCI•1: )=2:NE XTI 
? 3 5 ~ F O R I= OT O 7 : M 8 C I • 1 ) = INT ( 2 • l + • 5 ) : N E X Tl 
236: FORI=1T04:ts<1>=Me(4+I>:C8(4•I>=MB(I) :NE>.T l 
c43~ MV=45:GOSUBS00C:MV=46:G0SUB8000 
,44~ MV=55:GOSUB8JCC:MV=56:GOSU68:oc 
25:;.:, DATA255,12 1 19,62,89,88,23,c8,73,78 
2 5 ·j 5 I> AT A 1 'JB , 13 , 1 8 , 2 2 , 2 9, 1 0 8 , 7 2 , 7 c; , 8 3 , 8 8 
251~ DATA125,32,62,39,69 
2515 DATA125,14 1 17 1 84 1 87 
2516 DATA124,15,16,b5,86 


































3w6 C TV= TV +F V :M=M + 11: GOT03 040 
~1 ~ C lfo(M)<>PTHENFP=Of:GOT0311C 
!1. S 
~ V=V+TV 
~, 1 ~ ~E)l l:FTCLV)=FP:RETURN 
,.V=l'!N ·L ' • V=1:G0SUB3n00 
'-JQ1 l F "1 V = 1 2 0 R M V = 1 9 O R M V :: 8 2 0 R ~ V :: 8 9 1 H E N GOS UB 4 1'.J U 
•< fOR1=1T03:T=F£EKIM2+2+f):GDSUB12"~:T•46:GO!UB12rO (Jt, ~
~.J:3 ~E)TI:FORI=M1+1TOfT(1):T=P£EtC~Z+P+2> 
4J1 ;" .. ~V-F - EEK(l>:B(tt.0=F:G0SUB12CC:NEXll 
, ... , 1 
NC= FT (1 )-M1-1 
'J15 DC( 2+F) =oC(2+F )+NC+1 :oc<Z-f )::oc<Z-f' >-NC 
4..,, C N c= FT (1 > -1-M 1: M v=MN: 6 O suae CCC :RETURN 
41 ,- ~ -~ fORl=1T06:M=M5+~~+1N(I) 
l. 11 .. • TV=PEEK (K) :TV=TV+Z•< 12s-TVl :POKEM,TV:" en I :RETURN 
C: ~.nc E=p :F =-p 
__ .,,..,r."':"'>'~~· .. · ... - ........ t:,"" , .• ·- ........... • ., .• ~ ~"' ••• 
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552: 0D=PEEK(M3+Mv>:tv=2:POKEM3+MV,MB(J):G0SU~3 too 
553~ FO~EM3+~V,OD:1fFlC1)+2>FT(2)G0TOS555 
5535 1FV>V2THE.NV2=V 
5 5 4 ~ 1 ff 1 C 2) - f T C 1 ) > D C ( 2-F ) + FT C 1 ) - ~ 1 T H EN V 2 = 3 ~ 0 
5555 ~EXTJ:MV=LM:GOSUci5900:~(KV)=~ 
556_ E=P:P=-P:LV=1:RETURN 















8J5C l=l'i3+~:PK=FE EK(T):IFFK=CTHE.fiCF=CF+1 :POKEM4 •CF ,ti 
8J6~ PK=PKORMb(I):POKEl,PK 
81 :, : N E X l 1 : R E 1 URN 
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Appendix D -Instructions for Experiments 
Subjects were read the following instructions before 
responding to their first set of 78 problems in Experiment 
I . 
Instructions for Experiment I 
You are going to be asked for your personal opinion on the 
values of Othello moves. The information that you are given 
about a move will not be complete. That is, you will tnot# 
be shown a board configuration pointing out a possible move. 
Rather, you will be given information on only a few 
attributes of the move. 
For example, you might be asked your opinion of the 
"goodness" of an Othello move which captures three pieces 
and is made on the side of the board. This information 
could describe a number of completely different moves, made 
in hundreds of different situations. Your judgment should 
reflect your general opinion of the goodness of any move of 
this description. This type of judgment may seem unnatural 
because the provided information is incomplete. However, 
psychological research indicates that these types of 
questions can add insight to 
decision processes, but only 
thoughtfully. 
our understanding of human 
if they are answered 
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You will be asked to rate the goodness of 78 Othello moves 
on a T.V. screen with the aid of a small computer. Each of 
these hypothetical moves is completely independent, so do 
inot~ assume that they follow each other in a game. Please 
assume that each move is from a different Othello game and 
that each move occurs somewhere in the beginning or middle 
of a game, not in the last fifteen moves of a game. 
Three attributes of Othello moves will be used to describe 
them. Before you give your rating of moves, you should 
Understand what each attribute is. 
The first attribute is the number of pieces captured by a 
move. This refers to the number of enemy pieces which a 
more captures. Each of the moves you are about to rate will 
capture one, two, or four enemy pieces. Of course, during a 
game, a move might capture some other number of pieces, but 
for all of the hypothetical moves you are about to see, 
either one, two, or four pieces will be captured by the 
move. 
The second attribute is the position of the move. There 
are, of course, 64 positions on the Othello board. However, 
for the purposes of this research, five ttypestt of board 
Position have been defined. Please refer to the diagram 
which indicates these five position types. 
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The third attribute is countermoves. Your opponent will 
have a certain number of possible countermoves. Each of the 
moves you are about to rate will leave your opponent with 
five, ten, or fifteen countermoves on his/her next turn. 
This does not indicate exactly what positions your opponent 
can move to, nor does it tell you how many pieces your 
opponent will be able to capture. The attribute of 
countermoves simply tells you the number of possible legal 
moves your opponent would have available if you made the 
hypothetical move. 
For every hypothetical move, you will be given information 
on only two of the three attributes. This does not indicate 
whether the missing attribute is good or bad for that move. 
You simply will not be given information on one attribute. 
Instructions on the Response Scale 
For each hypothetical move, you will be asked to rate the 
"goodness" of a move on a scale which goes from good to bad. 
You will be presented with a line scale with the left end 
marked "BAD" and the right end marked "GOOD". You are to 
express your opinion of the goodness of a move by indicating 
a point on the line scale which corresponds to your 
judgment. For example, if you choose a point toward the 
middle of the scale, you believe that the move is average in 
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value. If you choose a point toward the 
scale, you believe 
choose a point toward 
that the move is 
the right end 
believe that the move is good. 
left end of the 
bad. Finally, if you 
of the scale, you 
Please be careful to save the ends of the scales only for 
the moves you think are terrible or fantastic. Usually, you 
will not be using the ends of the scale. 
Instructions for Experiment g 
You are going to be asked to play a game of Othello against 
a computer program and then give your opinions on the 
"goodness" of certain Othello moves. It is possible to win 
against the program, but it is also possible that you will 
lose. 
However, when you play your game, you will be asked to 
choose your moves according to a certain rule, rather than 
the way you would normally play. Whenever it is your turn, 
you are to evaluate every one of your alternative moves on 
the basis of a decision rule, and then choose the move with 
the highest value. First of all, the rule classifies the 
positions on the Othello board into five basic types, with 
different strategic values. (Subjects were given a map of 
the Othello board with the five position types, and the 
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positions were explained to them). 
Now that you are familiar with the types of positions, 
please also refer to your second sheet as I explain how you 
are to use your decision rule (Subjects were shown the 
appropriate decision rule, as shown in Chapter 3, and they 
were allowed to ask questions). 
Now, you will play your game against the computer (subjects 
played a game and were instructed on the use of the response 
scale before they filled out their booklet). 
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Appendix E - Summary Tables 
This Appendix contains the analyses of variance summary 
tables referenced in the text. In addition, it contains 
tables with estimates of the magnitudes of effect for each 





In the ANOVA tables, Position, Pieces 
Counterrnoves are designated P, F, and C, 
The contents of this appendix are the 
1. Magnitudes of Effects 
a. Subjects playing the weak program, subdesign 
Position X Pieces Flipped 
b. Subjects who played the weak program, subdesign 
Position X Countermoves 
c. Subjects who played the weak program, subdesign 
Pieces Flipped X Countermoves 
d. Subjects who played the strong program, 
subdesign Position X Pieces Flipped 
e. Subjects who played the strong program, 
subdesign Position X Countermoves 
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f. Subjects who played the strong program, 
subdesign Pieces Flipped X Countermoves 
2. Analysis of Variance Tables 
a. Opponent X Position X Pieces Flipped 
b. Opponent X Position X Countermoves 






F p PXF 
M.S. 1 2.11 
0 0 
2 2.20 .57 
0 
3 1.88 • 7 3 
0 
4 1.75 .77 
.28 
M.N. 1 3.01 
1.70 0 
2 1.86 1.92 
.57 
3 1.20 1.99 
0 
4 1.08 6.68 
0 
B.A. 1 1.48 
1.16 .41 
2 1.95 1.54 
.90 
3 1.65 1.57 
1.08 
4 2.84 1.74 
.70 
D.M. 1 .75 
1.06 .90 
2 1.21 .63 
0 
3 1.44 .32 
.24 
4 1.08 1.09 
.41 
M.R. 1 .29 
1.24 .07 
2 0 1. 76 
.07 
3 .2 .75 
0 
4 0 .21 
.38 
B.R. 1 1.74 
1.06 .42 
2 .28 .71 
.81 
3 .81 2.03 
0 
4 1.04 2.47 
0 
Magnitudes of effects for subjects playing the weak program 
in the Position X Pieces Flipped subdesign. 
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Gubj ect Booklet Effect 
C p CXP 
M.S. l 2.57 
.76 0 
2 2.08 .70 
.27 
3 1.88 .85 
.27 
4 1.92 1.18 
0 
M.N. l 3.84 
2.20 1.38 
2 3.41 1.30 
.77 
3 3.50 0 
0 
4 .98 6.40 
.89 
B. A. l 2.82 
1.11 0 
2 2.81 l.90 
.38 
3 2.87 1.71 
0 
4 2.27 2.37 
1.09 
D.M. l 4.26 
.71 1.09 
2 6.43 4.00 
.33 
3 6.24 0 
.so 
4 4.52 1.25 
0 
M.R. l 1.10 
1.34 0 
2 .51 l.89 
0 
3 2.05 1.23 
.43 
4 2.16 1.23 
.66 
B.R. 1 0 
0 0 
2 .5 2.13 
0 
3 .16 2.49 
.33 
4 0 2.98 
.24 
,/ 
Magnitudes of effects for subjects playing the weak program 





C p CXP 
M.S 1 3.03 2.26 
.58 
2 2.43 2.12 
0 
) 3 1.86 2.15 
.37 
i 4 1.91 2.11 0 
j 
) M.N. 1 4.27 
3.66 1.25 
I 
2 3.16 2.94 
1.15 
3 4.01 3.11 
0 
I 4 2.51 
1.91 0 
i 
I B.A. l 
2.08 1.88 .69 
2 3.24 2.16 
0 
3 3.40 2.49 
1.49 
4 2.70 2.90 
.33 
I 
! D.M. 1 4.33 .55 
0 
l 2 5.90 
1.09 .67 
1 3 6.15 1.41 
.so 
4 4.87 .62 
.50 
M.R. 1 1.65 0 
.37 
2 2.46 .11 
.25 
3 2.29 0 
.22 
4 2.33 .19 
.43 
B.R. l .79 
1.82 0 
2 .19 1.12 
.19 
3 0 1.40 
.19 
4 0 1.07 
.54 
Magnitudes of effects for subjects playing the weak program 






F p FXP 
P.S• 1 1.26 
0 1.05 
2 1.66 3.46 
.53 
3 2.13 4.07 .69 
4 1.96 4.83 0 
K.K• 1 0 
2.43 0 
2 1.14 1.80 0 
3 .79 2.57 
0 
4 0 3.18 
.37 
S.G• 1 1.03 
0 .09 
2 1.53 1.56 
.88 
3 .45 2.31 
• 71 
4 0 2.11 0 
D.S• 1 2.95 
0 .48 
2 2.52 1.45 
.68 
3 1.39 1.65 0 
4 .87 1.78 0 
D.G• 1 .97 
0 0 
2 .97 .16 
0 
3 1.93 .69 
.75 
4 .52 1. 38 
0 
M.5• 1 3.22 
.71 0 
2 1.85 .37 
0 
3 2.0 .58 
.BO 
4 1.11 .13 
.46 
Magnitudes of effects for subjects playing the strong program 
in the Position X Pieces Flipped subdesign. 
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Booklet Effect 
C p CXP 
P.S• 1 3.92 
2.02 0 
2 3.10 3.85 1.42 
3 4.35 2.97 .52 
4 3.86 5.34 1.78 
K. J(. 1 1.28 1.90 
.61 
2 1.57 1.15 .35 
3 1.40 1.50 0 
4 1.27 3.3 .77 
s.G. 1 .09 .59 0 
2 .44 1.24 • 37 
3 .38 1.85 0 
4 0 1.90 .48 
D.S. 1 2.55 .21 
• 7 5 
2 3.75 1.37 .29 
3 2.78 1.11 0 
4 2.71 2.75 .15 
D.G. 1 1.00 .47 
0 
2 1.65 .25 .21 
3 1.87 0 
.32 
4 1.14 1. 86 .• 58 
M.5. 1 3.5 0 
.40 
2 3.62 1.27 
1.00 
3 4.11 0 
0 
4 4.28 0 
.67 
Magnitudes of effects for subjects playing the strong program 






Subject Booklet Effect ---
C F CXF 
P.S. 1 4.11 3.46 1.15 
I 
2 3.85 3.89 1.88 
3 2.81 1.29 .88 
4 4.73 3.54 .16 
K.K. 1 2.25 1.21 .31 
2 1.39 .47 .43 
3 1.71 .42 .11 
I 4 1.97 0 0 
S.G. 1 0 .79 .94 I 
2 .27 2.22 0 
1 3 .27 .67 .19 
4 0 .22 0 
D.S. l 1.48 2.06 0 
2 2.15 2.04 0 
3 2.32 .79 • 58 
4 1.43 1.09 0 
D.G. l 1.0 1.12 .38 
2 1.1 1.0 0 
3 .93 1.19 0 
4 .70 .97 .so 
M.S. 1 2.53 3.01 1.96 
2 1.74 2.44 1.22 
3 2.94 2.76 .72 
4 2.47 2.53 0 
Magnitudes of effects for subjects playing the strong program 
in the Pieces Flipped by Countermoves subdesign. 
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